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Before police perform a search or seizure, they typically must meet the proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion standard. Moreover, even if they meet the
appropriate standard, their evidence must be individualized to the suspect
and cannot rely on purely probabilistic inferences. Scholars and courts have
long defended the distinction between individualized and purely probabilistic
evidence, but existing theories of individualization fail to articulate principles
that are descriptively accurate or normatively desirable. They overlook the
only benefit that the individualization requirement can offer: reducing hassle.
Hassle measures the chance that an innocent person will experience a search
or seizure. Because some investigation methods meet the relevant suspicion
standards but nevertheless impose too many stops and searches on the inno-
cent, courts must have a lever independent from the suspicion standard to
constrain the scope of criminal investigations. The individualization require-
ment has unwittingly performed this function, but not in an optimal way.
Individualization has kept hassle low by entrenching old methods of investiga-
tion. Because courts designate practices as individualized when they are costly
(for example, gumshoe methods) or lucky (for example, tips), the requirement
has confined law enforcement to practices that cannot scale. New investigation
methods such as facial-recognition software and pattern-based data mining,
by contrast, can scale up law-enforcement activities very quickly. Although
these innovations have the potential to increase the accuracy of stops and
searches, they may also increase the total number of innocent individuals
searched because of the innovations’ speed and cost-effectiveness. By reforming
individualization to minimize hassle, courts can enable law-enforcement in-
novations that are fairer and more accurate than traditional police investiga-
tions without increasing burdens on the innocent.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
I. Individualized Suspicion Amiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
A. The Snowflake Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
B. The Felt Belief Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
C. Suspicious Conduct Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
D. Crime-Out Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
Deep gratitude is owed to Derek Bambauer, Barbara Atwood, Josh Blackman, Shun-Ling
Chen, Ed Cheng, Mike Chiorazzi, James Cooper, Deven Desai, Jeffrey Fagan, Kristine Huskey,
Shasta Inman, Orin Kerr, Jason Kreag, Dave Marcus, Toni Massaro, Jeff Rachlinski, Carol Rose,
Roy Spece, Rodney States, Alan Trammell, and Brent White for excellent feedback, and to
Melissa Ahlers and Nathan Berry for research assistance.
461
462 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:461
E. Ending the Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
II. Hassle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
A. A Compact Model for Criminal Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
B. The Importance of Hassle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
C. Individualization Reduces Hassle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
D. Other Instincts Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
1. Odd but Legal Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
2. A Preference for More Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
3. Undefined Suspicion Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
4. The Search for Distributional Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
III. The Future of Suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
A. More Open and Honest Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
B. Fewer Vague Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
C. More Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
D. Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Introduction
A police officer has submitted an application to a magistrate judge re-
questing warrants to search every dorm room in the Harvard College resi-
dence halls for illegal drugs. To establish probable cause, the officer
furnished a copy of a recently published study about student life at Harvard.
The study is methodologically sound and concludes that 60% of the on-
campus dorm rooms contain illicit drugs.
Naturally, the magistrate judge will deny the application, but why?
While probable cause is not defined as a precise probability, we are told that
the standard sits below “more likely than not.”1 A 60% likelihood of finding
drugs in any given dorm room should easily clear the bar.
The textbook response to this Harvard dorm hypothetical, a variant of a
puzzle posed by Orin Kerr,2 is that the suspicion stemming from a statistical
study is not individualized. The evidence is not tailored to each Harvard
student whose home is to be searched. The study offers only probabilistic
1. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
2. Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in The Political
Heart of Criminal Procedure 131, 135–37 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012). This is
actually a variant on Kerr’s original hypothetical. Kerr asked what should happen if the police
request a warrant to search one specified Harvard student’s dorm in order to explore the
importance of back stories and the fruitless efforts of the police that may not be reported to
judges. Id. Kerr was chiefly concerned about the potential that the officer selected the dorm
room for an improper reason. Id. I changed the hypothetical to cover all Harvard dorm rooms
in order to reduce the potential of abuse and to illustrate how hassle animates intuitive re-
sponses to this hypothetical.
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evidence. No matter how great the chances of finding drugs may be, lack of
individualization presents a disqualifying flaw.3
Individualized suspicion therefore consists of two distinct prongs. The
police must have suspicion—a fairly good chance of finding evidence of a
crime—and they also must have individualization. This Article explores the
second prong, the individualization requirement, in search of a principled
distinction between particularized evidence and evidence that is probabilisti-
cally sufficient but constitutionally flawed.
The predominant justification for the individualization requirement ap-
peals to a rejection of cold calculations and group-based generalizations, but
this appeal falls flat with a little scrutiny. Police and judges must always
resort to rough estimates of the conditional probability that a suspect has
engaged in crime. Whether police use a collection of details (a partially cor-
roborated tip and unusual travel habits) or just one important detail (a
weaving car or a tattoo matching a victim’s description), they ultimately
must ask whether the innocent explanations for the observations are much
more probable than the illicit ones.4 Indeed, even vocal opponents of actua-
rial policing have acknowledged that all suspicion is built from probabilistic
inferences.5
Moreover, the distinctions that we intuitively draw between individual-
ized and merely mathematical suspicion get the public policy backwards.
Because the investigation methods approved by courts usually rely on the
observations and perceptions of police, the “particularized” evidence is likely
to be biased, error prone, and disproportionately aimed at poor and minor-
ity residents living in higher-crime areas.6 Subjective factors like a suspect’s
“nervousness” or “furtive movements” can be imagined or, worse still, man-
ufactured through deceit.7 And the long, detailed narratives that courts have
3. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable cause,
a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with re-
spect to that person.”); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (separately listing
“reliability” and “particularity” requirements for evidence supporting probable cause); Sherry
F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at 69, 70.
4. See Colb, supra note 3, at 78.
5. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction:
Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 17 (2007).
6. This occurs not only or primarily due to implicit bias or prejudice among police. It is
also the natural result of deploying police in greater numbers to high-crime neighborhoods.
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 1997 (2008).
7. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 51 tbl.11, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) [hereinafter Report of Jeffrey Fagan], available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf. The Fagan Report found that,
among the more than 2 million stops performed by the New York Police Department between
2004 and 2009 that had sufficient documentation for analysis, 42% listed “furtive movements”
among the reasons justifying the stop, and 10.4% listed “suspicious bulge.” Id. When the
police suspected a weapons violation, “furtive movements” was reported 60% of the time, and
“suspicious bulge” over 34% of the time. Id. Police frisks uncovered weapons only 15% of the
time. Id. at 64 tbl.15.
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come to expect from police in order to satisfy particularization requirements
are so inconsistent that they risk diluting the suspicion requirement.8 Indi-
vidualization seems to be intellectually bankrupt and morally hazardous.
Nevertheless, our fumbling with the notion of individualization per-
forms latent but valuable work. Given that all evidence is probabilistic, the
virtue of individualization has little to do with the nature of probabilistic
calculations. It doesn’t even have much to do with the particular suspect.
Instead, individualization protects everybody else from the potential costs of
law-enforcement investigations. The techniques courts and scholars accept
as individualized exclude most of the population from the practical likeli-
hood of police intrusions. Because they rely on perceptions of police officers
or on happenstance like tips, the traditional methods cannot scale. Actuarial
methods can.
This Article argues that the purpose of individualization is to minimize
hassle. Hassle is the chance that the police will stop or search an innocent
person against his will.9 After all, while we may not all be Harvard students,
we do inevitably engage in activities that predict a high chance of crime. We
pace. We circle the block. We travel with bulky or light luggage. And we
attend Phish concerts. If the police were able to act on all reasonably predic-
tive statistical models en masse, we would experience an inappropriate and
dramatic increase in suspicion-based searches and seizures. The individuali-
zation requirement constrains hassle by ensuring that an innocent person is
unlikely to be stopped or searched even if he seems suspicious from time to
time.
The twin prongs of individualized suspicion—suspicion and individual-
ization—ought to be loosely guided by hit and hassle rates. A hit rate is the
probability that a stop or search will uncover evidence of a crime. Hit rates
measure suspicion and must meet the relevant standard (reasonable suspi-
cion for Terry stops and probable cause for full-blown searches and
8. Justice Marshall described the reasonable suspicion standard as having a “chameleon-
like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418
(9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In his dissent in Sokolow, Justice Marshall
included a string citation with pieces of evidence that had been used to build suspicion in
previous cases: suspect was first to deplane; last to deplane; deplaned from the middle; pur-
chased one-way tickets; purchased round-trip tickets; traveled on a nonstop flight; changed
planes; traveled with no luggage; traveled with a gym bag; traveled with new suitcases; traveled
alone; traveled with a companion; acted nervous; acted too calm. Id. at 13–14 (citing ten
cases).
9. I use the word “hassle” to capture a broad range of governmental impositions, from
inconveniences to serious affronts to dignity. The word will fail to reflect the depth of intru-
sion in some cases (invasive searches, wrongful arrests, and uses of force, for example). But
“hassle” does reflect the disruption of liberty that carries Fourth Amendment significance in
even the most minor cases of involuntary searches or seizures. Part II defines the term more
precisely.
February 2015] Hassle 465
seizures).10 Hassle rates, by contrast, measure the probability that an inno-
cent person within the relevant population will be stopped or searched
under the program. Hassle rates speak to individualization. If a program is
likely to cause too much hassle, the police have not sufficiently narrowed the
scope of the investigation, no matter how high the hit rate may be. Hassle
rates keep track of the societal costs of criminal investigations, and hit rates
ensure that the costs are justified.
Courts and scholars have already grown accustomed to examining hit
rates when data are available.11 When they are not, courts and scholars have
used common sense and experience to estimate the same thing: whether the
police had a decent shot of uncovering incriminating evidence during a stop
or search. But hit rates alone cannot keep the government in check. Hassle
rates are also crucial to the Fourth Amendment’s protection. For rare
crimes, like murder, a high hit rate can guarantee a low hassle rate. But for
more common crimes, such as drug possession,12 an additional constraint
must curb governmental intrusions. At a higher level of abstraction, hit and
hassle perform the delicate balancing of interests that the Fourth Amend-
ment demands.
Hassle explains many of the instincts already embedded in the individu-
alization precedent. For example, it explains the courts’ consistent prefer-
ence for police narratives chock-full of detail, even when each additional
detail does not contribute much to the amount of suspicion.13
Hassle can also explain the Harvard dorm room hypothetical. If an of-
ficer requests warrants to search the dorms of all 6,000 students living in
Harvard residential halls, we know ex ante that approximately 2,400 of them
will not have illegal drugs. In one fell swoop, the police will have imposed
significant costs on the innocent population in the Harvard and Cambridge
communities.
On the other hand, the Harvard dorm room hypothetical also com-
mands attention to a lost opportunity. If the warrant were issued, the Cam-
bridge police could have greater success searching a Harvard student and
could create inroads for criminal enforcement within elite communities oth-
erwise immune to the enforcement of minor criminal laws. But the domi-
nant understanding of individualization will push the police out of the
Harvard dorms and back into the homes and pockets of the poor, the uned-
ucated, and the traditionally suspect.
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requiring articulable suspicion for a stop);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (requiring probable cause for a search).
11. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); David
A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work 13–14, 79–84
(2002).
12. See Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Health, United States, 2012, at 193–94 tbl.58 (2013) [hereinafter CDC Drug Usage Ta-
ble], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus12.pdf (finding that, in 2012, 9.2% of
Americans aged 12 and older had used illicit drugs in the past month and that 21.3% of
Americans between the ages of 18 and 25 had done so).
13. See infra Section II.D.2.
466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:461
Courts and advocates should reform the concept of individualization to
focus on minimizing hassle.14 And they can do so without making signifi-
cant changes to existing doctrine. This Article explains why and how in three
parts.
Part I collects the definitions and justifications for individualization that
have floated around the legal scholarship over the last five decades. Individu-
alization has attracted the attention of a long list of distinguished scholars,
and with the exception of Fred Schauer, all have vigorously defended the
concept.15 Charles Nesson champions the notion of case-by-case assess-
ment.16 Laurence Tribe highlights the importance of human intuition.17 An-
drew Taslitz argues that suspicion should be based on conduct under the
control of the suspect,18 and Bernard Harcourt suggests that police should
trace suspicion from a crime to a suspect rather than attempt to predict
which individuals are criminals.19 Each of these theories fails to describe ac-
tual or desirable outcomes. Nesson’s and Tribe’s theories entrench the dis-
cretion of police officers in the teeth of ample evidence of bias and error,
while Taslitz’s and Harcourt’s theories put impracticable limits on criminal
investigation.
There is a way out. Part II introduces hassle, a concept that operates
behind the scenes of the individualization doctrine and deserves attention.
Hassle measures how much pain an investigatory program will impose on
the innocent even when the program is moderately successful at detecting
crime. Even if a new police tool does a very good job of detecting suspicious
conduct, if the tool is inexpensive and used with abandon, the hassle it
brings to the wrongly suspected should justify Fourth Amendment scrutiny
on its own. The concept of hassle will become increasingly valuable in an era
of technological change. Indeed, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
14. I do not mean to imply that data science is immune from human error and influ-
ence. See, e.g., Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, Harv. Bus. Rev. Blog Net-
work (Apr. 1, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data/.
Data-driven policing is bound to have its problems, but it beats the alternatives.
15. Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003); see also
Colb, supra note 3, at 71, 102 (neither rejecting nor endorsing the distinction between proba-
bilistic and concrete harms but recognizing that such a distinction is “irrational” and “at times
arbitrary”).
16. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Com-
plexity, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187, 1191–92 (1979).
17. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 1332–38.
18. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at
145, 146.
19. See Harcourt, supra note 5, at 18. Harcourt also distinguishes the actuarial policing
that he discourages from “clinical methods” that “rel[y] primarily on the subjective judgment
of experienced decision makers.” Id. at 16 & 269 n.48. But Harcourt has also criticized the case
law on individualized suspicion, calling the concept “a rhetorical placeholder used to bless
police practices without providing policing agencies with any guidance or requirements.” Ber-
nard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 809, 851 (2011).
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reached for the concept of hassle without having a name for it when the
court invalidated aspects of the National Security Agency (“NSA”)’s Up-
stream program.20 And hassle matches and explains judicial instincts about
individualization better than other theories. Although courts are likely to
resist defining hassle thresholds in precise statistical terms, hassle provides a
badly needed benchmark. It fills the vacuum in individualization’s organiz-
ing principles.
Part III explores the implications of hit- and hassle-based individualized
suspicion. Not only is a hassle-based individualization requirement more
descriptively accurate but it also has desirable normative implications for
police practices. It tolerates innovation in policing. It also permits law-en-
forcement agencies to limit their operations using carefully designed ran-
dom selection instead of relying on the luck and resource constraints that
currently control their scope.21 As long as a program has a high enough hit
rate to satisfy suspicion requirements, the police should be permitted to
keep hassle rates low by selecting among suspicious individuals in a mechan-
ical but evenhanded way. For example, suppose new software can analyze
video footage from security cameras to detect hand-to-hand drug sales with
a high hit rate (that is, most of the time the software alerts, it is correct).
Because of the high frequency of this sort of crime, incessant monitoring
throughout a city is likely to produce too much hassle. Rather than aban-
doning the software altogether, the police could reduce hassle by responding
only to a randomly selected portion of the alerts. Granted, this means that
police will choose arbitrarily among individuals who are equally likely to
have committed a crime, but arbitrary selection is more legitimate, less bi-
ased, and less prone to manipulation than the organic selection that police
use today.
These changes offer some hope of redistributing the costs of fruitless
searches from the poor and minority communities that frequently come into
contact with police to the wealthier, whiter communities that traditionally
have lived above suspicion.22 This would be a welcome improvement.
20. See In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and
Related Procedures, at 75–78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2011), available at https://
www.eff.org/files/filenode/fisc_opinion_-_unconstitutional_surveillance_0.pdf (declassified in
2013).
21. This lines up with the recommendations of Bernard Harcourt and Tracey Meares in
their persuasive article on randomization. See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19. This Article
will promote randomization for many of the same reasons that they have, with an emphasis on
its ability to constrain the hassle of potentially expansive law-enforcement programs.
22. Our cognitive dissonance at the thought of attributing suspicion to attending
Harvard reveals the limits of traditional methods.
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I. Individualized Suspicion Amiss
Before conducting a stop, search, or another invasion of a Fourth
Amendment interest, the government usually must have sufficient suspi-
cion.23 This suspicion is measured by the chance that law enforcement will
uncover evidence of a crime.
Sometimes the government will have abundant suspicion, as when a
police officer observes an illegal assault rifle, or finds a DNA match, or fol-
lows an impaired driver as he pulls off the road, climbs up a tree, and yells
“I’m an owl!”24 But the police do not need certainty or anything close to it.
They need only to satisfy the probable cause standard in the case of searches,
arrests, and exigencies and to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard in the
case of brief stops and limited frisk searches.25
The Supreme Court has declined to define these standards with statisti-
cal precision, but it has stated that probable cause requires a “fair
probability” that evidence of a past or future crime will be uncovered.26 This
standard is lower than the preponderance standard, and it is roughly esti-
mated as a 331/3% chance of recovering evidence of a crime.27 The reasona-
ble suspicion standard is lower still.28 Thus, police must have some chance of
success before engaging in a search or a stop, but that chance need not be
large.
23. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“The Fourth Amendment
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search and seizure is ordinarily unreasona-
ble in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”). The courts have recognized an
exception to the suspicion requirement in a line of “special needs” and “administrative search”
cases. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (permitting DUI check-
points); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (allowing suspicionless
drug testing of U.S. Customs employees); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1970) (permitting inspections of liquor stores); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d
Cir. 1974) (permitting airport security screens); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1973) (same), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
2007).
24. Sebastian Murdock, ‘I’m an Owl’ Says Drunk Driver Troy Prockett Hiding in Tree:
Cops, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/10/troy-prockett-drunk-
owl_n_4577317.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 6:56 PM).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925).
26. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
27. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (explaining that probable cause does not
require a preponderance of evidence); Edward K. Cheng, Comment on Dawid, Faigman, and
Fienberg (2014), 43 Soc. Methods & Res. 396, 397 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, The World
Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 40 (1991); Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at i–ii. But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable
Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. (Special Issue) 72, 86–88
(2011) (showing that judges seem to work with a probability closer to 50% to determine
probable cause).
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22; Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59
Vand. L. Rev. 407, 460 (2006).
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But courts frequently make a further, independent inquiry. In addition
to meeting the threshold probability for suspicion, the “belief of guilt must
be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.”29 Thus,
it is not enough for law enforcement to have adequate suspicion. Police of-
ficers must have particularized, or, as it is often called, individualized suspi-
cion. While courts have applied the individualization rhetoric
inconsistently,30 the requirement is sacrosanct for most criminal-procedure
scholars.31 And yet its purpose remains elusive.
This Part will identify and assess four theories that have attempted to
describe and justify the individualization requirement. In order, they are the
snowflake theory (each case is unique and cannot be based on generaliza-
tions); the felt belief theory (to promote institutional legitimacy, law en-
forcement and judges actually need to harbor a belief of guilt); the
suspicious conduct theory (suspicion should be based on the suspect’s ac-
tual behavior); and the crime-out theory (suspicion should build from the
crime toward a suspect rather than the other way around).
All of these explanations for the meaning and purpose of individualiza-
tion make wishful distinctions. They fail to describe actual jurisprudential
outcomes and, in any event, are normatively undesirable.
A. The Snowflake Theory
The most natural reading of “individualization” draws a distinction be-
tween generalizations and case-specific facts.32 It demands holistic reason-
ing—rather than the application of probabilities—so that individuals are
judged for who they really are.33
29. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (describing two separate elements for “articulable
suspicion,” the first measuring suspicion and the second assessing particularization).
30. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (conflating
particularization and suspicion); Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 127–28 (Del. 2002) (same).
31. Scholars tend to jockey for position as the underdog. I acknowledge that is precisely
what I am doing here. Harcourt, a strong critic of actuarial policing, has insisted that my
position (in favor of actuarial methods) dominates the reality, if not the theory, of criminal
procedure. Harcourt, supra note 5, at 19–21. But Schauer is the lone scholar whom Harcourt
identifies as a champion of actuarial justice (aside from economic defenses of racial profil-
ing—references that are hardly likely to curry favor among legal academics). Id. As this Part
will show, the long list of scholars writing in favor of particularization includes Laurence Tribe,
Charles Nesson, Edward Cheng, Andrew Taslitz, and, of course, Harcourt himself. But see
Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 848 (embracing probabilistic ex ante estimates of
suspicion).
32. Taslitz, supra note 18 (discussing how probable cause must be measured by the facts
of a particular case); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 Yale L.J. 1408, 1425–27 (1979).
33. Thanks to Derek Bambauer for summarizing uniqueness arguments as expressing the
unfounded belief that each case is “its own special snowflake.”
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Holistic reasoning finds support in a range of contexts from affirmative
action to consumer protection.34 Nesson famously argued that the reasona-
ble doubt standard of proof required for criminal prosecutions “does not
lend itself to being expressed in correlative probabilistic terms and, indeed,
operates in an environment judicially structured to submerge probabilistic
quantification in the factual complexity and uniqueness of specific cases.”35
Holistic reasoning also incorporates the preference for human intuition cele-
brated in the Trial by Mathematics literature, in which Tribe and others ar-
gue that human intuition has its own irreplaceable wisdom that scientific
predictions cannot match.36
In the context of criminal investigation, Taslitz has been the most vocal
advocate for case-by-case reasoning. He argues that individualization has an
important function when criminal suspects present “extraordinary combi-
nations of behaviors and traits” that generalities cannot adequately
capture.37
Neither Taslitz nor Nesson harbors any illusions that holistic determina-
tion is error free. Rather, they argue that justice requires considering combi-
nations of facts unique to the individual beyond what systems of statistical
inference can offer. Each case deserves its own evaluation.
The Supreme Court shares some responsibility for this romance with
unique cases, as its criminal-procedure jurisprudence emphasizes the impor-
tance of case-by-case, fact-specific analysis. Although the Court has ap-
proved the use of some formulaic profiles,38 more often it has insisted that
police couch their justifications in ornate descriptions to show that each
suspect was chosen for unique and special reasons.
The reasoning of Richards v. Wisconsin39 is typical. In that case, the
Court had to decide whether a police officer could execute an arrest warrant
without first knocking on the door and announcing himself if the arrest
concerned a drug-related offense. The Fourth Amendment usually requires
34. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604
(1994). For example, Edith Ramirez, chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission, has
warned that increased use of consumer data to make lending or other decisions is unfortunate
because companies will “make determinations about individuals, not based on concrete facts,
but on inferences or correlations that may be unwarranted.” Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: The Privacy
Challenges of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair (Aug. 19, 2013). For a critique of
the holistic reasoning used in affirmative action cases, see Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t
Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 517 (2007).
35. Nesson, supra note 16, at 1191.
36. Tribe, supra note 5; Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L.
Rev. 401 (1986); Kerr, supra note 2, at 139; Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich.
L. Rev. 1021 (1977); Peter Tillers, Trial by Mathematics—Reconsidered, 10 L. Probability &
Risk 167 (2011).
37. Taslitz, supra note 18, at 158.
38. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); see also Tung Yin, The Probative
Values and Pitfalls of Drug Courier Profiles as Probabilistic Evidence, 5 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R.
141 (2000).
39. 520 U.S. 385 (1987).
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that police announce themselves when executing an arrest,40 but if the police
have reasonable suspicion that the defendant will destroy evidence or attack
the arresting officers, they may forgo the knock-and-announce procedure.41
The government’s theory was that the disposable nature of drugs made all
drug-related arrests good candidates for a per-se knock-and-announce ex-
ception.42 Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion explained that a categorical
rule allowing drug arrests to proceed without a knock and announce would
overgeneralize since it would encompass many situations that pose no risk of
evidence destruction or violence.43 By contrast, if the police know that the
arrestee is aware of their presence—as was the case for Richards—the suspi-
cion that evidence may be destroyed would be tailored to the situation, and
police would be free to overtake the premises without knocking.44
Justice Stevens started his opinion by rejecting generalizations, but by
the end, he did nothing of the sort. As he applied the law to the facts, he
substituted one rule (drug crimes = no-knock exigency) for another (drug
crimes + awareness = no-knock exigency).
Put another way, suppose that a drug offender is very likely to dispose of
his drugs when the police knock and announce their presence. A rule al-
lowing the police to enter without first knocking is no more mechanical
than Justice Stevens’s rule permitting police to enter when one more fact
(awareness) is added. Justice Stevens’s rule likely increases the probability
that a defendant will attempt to destroy drugs, but this advances the suspi-
cion prong of individualized suspicion, not the individualization prong. As a
matter of individualization, Justice Stevens’s rule relies just as heavily on
generalizations as the rule he rejects.
Case-by-case reasoning cannot and does not eliminate generalizations.
Instead, it forces the generalizations to operate in informal and ad hoc ways.
An inevitable result of case-by-case thinking is the creation of squishy fac-
tors like “furtive movements” that give the government’s cases a gloss of
particularity. These factors are based on in-the-moment, holistic impres-
sions that can absorb any number of details that the police observe.45 The
obligation to generate a narrative distracts from much more important
questions, such as whether the government is doing a good job choosing its
targets.
Cases can be unique in the sense that they involve one-of-a-kind combi-
nations of factors, but the reasoning of a case cannot be unique. Prediction
40. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
41. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
42. See id. at 390.
43. Id. at 393.
44. Id. at 396. Violation of the knock-and-announce rule no longer comes with a sup-
pression remedy. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). But the change in remedy does
not affect this Article’s exploration of the Fourth Amendment’s bounds.
45. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983); United States v. Glover, 851 A.2d
473, 477 (D.C. 2004); People v. Woods, 475 N.E.2d 442, 442 (N.Y. 1984).
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requires generalization. Whatever is truly unique about a case cannot sup-
port an educated guess about its outcome unless it is analogized to some
other generalization. The generalizations can be more finely grained by ad-
ding variables,46 but the nature of the prediction does not change. Schauer
has it right: “[O]nce we understand that most of the ordinary differences
between general and particular decisionmaking are differences of degree and
not differences in kind, we become properly skeptical of a widespread but
mistaken view that the particular has some sort of natural epistemological or
moral primacy over the general.”47
It might seem quite unnatural and even immoral to give up on the
promise of unique treatment, but one need only think of McCleskey v.
Kemp48 to see the tragic legacy of “case-by-case” thinking.49 In McCleskey, an
African-American man convicted of murder challenged his death sentence
using statistical evidence of racial bias.50 McCleskey’s challenge relied on the
Baldus study, an analysis of over two thousand death-eligible murder cases
tried in Georgia during the 1970s.51 The study showed that the races of the
victims and murderers were strong determinants of capital sentences even
after controlling for dozens of other explanatory variables (such as the
method of killing, the victim’s experience before death, the defendant’s
prior record, and the number of victims).52 The Supreme Court accepted the
validity of the statistical study, but it nevertheless rejected McCleskey’s chal-
lenge because each individual death-row defendant had his own chance, in
front of his own jury, to show why his case was unsuitable for capital pun-
ishment based “on the particularized nature of the crime and the particular-
ized characteristics of the individual defendant.”53 This move allowed the
Court to sweep glaring patterns of bias under the rug in order to preserve
the illusion of case-by-case determination.
46. Predictive models can also add the interaction between two variables. For example,
the combination of traveling for a very short amount of time and traveling without a suit
might increase the chance of crime more than either of the two variables alone since business
travelers frequently travel for short amounts of time but will also usually have a suit.
47. Schauer, supra note 15, at 69, 106 (“[I]ndividualized analysis is simply an aggregate
of stereotypes . . . .”); accord David L. Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified The-
ory of Constitutional Facts 69 (2008) (“[W]here error may be recognizable in a class of
cases, it may be practically unknowable in particular cases.”).
48. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
49. Sherry Colb links the moral intuitions that dominate the “statistical-proof” debate to
the reasoning in McCleskey, too, and she also connects these intuitions to the reasoning that
led to the market share liability doctrine in the civil DES cases. But Colb is more cautious than
I am about insisting that we change our moral barometers. Colb, supra note 3, at 79–82.
50. McCleskey’s writ challenged his sentence on the grounds of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
51. The study was conducted by David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Wood-
worth. Id.
52. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661, 684–85 (1983).
53. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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McCleskey embedded a misunderstanding of epic proportions into
equal-protection law. The Court failed to appreciate the import of the
Baldus study. Despite the trappings of a “holistic” process, McCleskey was
judged using generalizations. But instead of being judged by the right gener-
alizations (those related to the heinousness of his crime), he was judged by
the wrong ones (his race and the race of his victim). By denying that gener-
alizations were used at all in his conviction, the Court was able to avoid
accountability. The individualization requirement has allowed the myth of
unique cases to pollute the law of criminal investigations as well.
B. The Felt Belief Theory
Nesson’s work rejects purely probabilistic proof, at least in the case of
criminal convictions, by arguing that the jury should have an “abiding con-
viction” that the defendant did it.54 Jurors should harbor a complete and
confident belief, even if past experience and common sense tell us that there
is a nonnegligible chance they are wrong. Nesson argues that the mistakes of
wholly convinced jurors, even if they are wrong more often than statistically
derived determinations of guilt, serve an objective that is different from and
sometimes superior to accuracy: final resolution.55
Under this theory, judgments coming from wholly convinced judges
and juries, flawed as they may be, serve the institutional interests of the
courts by presenting the party—particularly the losing party—and the pub-
lic with a monolithic outcome that leaves little room to doubt the factual
findings.56 This helps preserve the authoritative reputation and popular le-
gitimacy of the judiciary57 and potentially helps jurors and litigants feel
more psychological closure with the matter.58
Although Nesson focuses on the reasonable doubt standard required for
criminal convictions, the same institutional interests are implicated with le-
gal determinations using lower standards. Indeed, Nesson cites the famous
blue bus hypothetical, based on Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc.,59 a civil action
decided under the much lower preponderance standard. In Smith, the plain-
tiff suffered injuries when she was forced off the road by a bus barreling
54. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1378 (1985); Nesson, supra note 16, at 1192–93.
55. Nesson, supra note 16, at 1194.
56. The right to appeal, and the possibility of reversal even on determinations of fact,
shows that there are some limits to how well Nesson’s theory describes the judiciary’s views of
its own role.
57. Nesson, supra note 16, at 1194.
58. A related theory concerns the dehumanization of the legal process. Mechanical deter-
minations may be an affront to the dignity each individual is owed when the government
contemplates taking punitive action. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1375–77. For example, Tribe wor-
ries about the symbolic expressions of values that are broadcast by judicial systems that put
too much emphasis on statistical models. Id. at 1392. See also Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 386 (1970).
59. 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
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toward her at forty miles per hour.60 To prove her case, the plaintiff offered
her own testimony (which, for the purposes of this discussion, we can as-
sume was credible) that the bus was blue—the color of the defendant’s bus
fleet. Although the original case opinion did not offer a precise estimate of
the chance that somebody else’s blue bus may have been operating on the
street at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, the case has bred a sort of legal
urban myth that the plaintiff submitted evidence showing that 80% of the
blue buses running down that particular street were the defendant’s and
20% were not. Whatever the true probabilities, the action was thrown out
for failure to prove the case using more than mere “mathematical chances.”61
A long line of distinguished scholars insist that this was the correct out-
come.62 Indeed, they still defend the outcome of Smith even if the defendant
had been responsible for 99% of the blue buses running down the street.63
After all, a jury would not be able to quiet the nagging thought that it may
have been that other infrequent bus.64
The individualization requirement for criminal investigations might
promote the same interests in finality and responsibility. Even if human
decisionmaking is flawed, perhaps a court should still require that an officer
feel certain that a suspect is guilty before stopping and searching him, or at
least be able to gut check his decision rather than abdicate his judgment to a
statistical process.
Sure enough, Carroll v. United States,65 an old case frequently quoted for
its definition of probable cause, could support a distinction between belief
and unenthusiastic assent to mathematical inference. In that case, the Su-
preme Court explained that an officer must have sufficient information “to
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has
been committed.”66 Many cases have made clear that an officer’s subjective
belief is not enough without additional objective evidence that would lead a
reasonable officer to conclude that crime might be afoot.67 But these cases do
not necessarily deny that subjective belief is a necessary condition for indi-
vidualized suspicion.
While the felt belief theory and the snowflake theory both lead to rejec-
tions of purely statistical evidence, they do so on different grounds. The
60. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 754–55.
61. Id. at 755.
62. Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J. 1254, 1269–71
(2013); see also Nesson, supra note 16, at 1192–93; Tribe, supra note 5, at 1376.
63. Cheng, supra note 62, at 1270 (using a gatecrashers hypothetical).
64. The blue bus paradox and others like it have also inspired debate about whether
arresting two or three people for a crime that the police know only one has committed is
constitutionally permissible. The definiteness of an innocent person’s arrest triggers the “iden-
tifiable victim effect,” although, as Colb points out, the same doubts should trouble any sys-
tem engaged in repeated actions. Colb, supra note 3, at 76–78, 101.
65. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
66. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161 (emphasis added) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645
(1878)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).
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snowflake theory is built on a fallacy; it assumes, wrongly, that distinctions
can be drawn between cases without resorting to a combination of general-
izations. Thus, the snowflake theory’s flaws are insurmountable. Case-by-
case reasoning simply doesn’t exist. The felt belief theory, on the other hand,
does articulate a standard that can be implemented. Individualization would
be satisfied if a human can trust the evidence using his own senses and
experiences.
Nevertheless, the felt belief theory has three significant and intertwined
flaws. First, it is not possible to separate evidence that can lead to a felt belief
from evidence that cannot. For example, there is no reason to assume that
witness testimony about the operator of the blue bus can move a juror to
complete belief but methodologically sound calculations of the chance that
the defendant operated the blue bus cannot. The distinction imports some-
body’s strong preferences for certain types of evidence, allowing some types
of evidence to persuade the juror, judge, or officer to a felt belief while
denying other types of evidence the chance to do so.
Second, the theory gets the moral imperative backwards. Nobody—
whether juror, magistrate, or police investigator—should maintain his be-
liefs with full conviction. Indeed, procedural rights and judicial appeals are
designed to avoid any delusions of perfection.68 Since most evidence should
leave some doubt in the minds of the decisionmakers, evidence cannot be
categorized along the lines that Nesson and others suggest.
Finally, if the felt belief theory rejects all mechanical forms of evidence,
the theory runs into paradoxes when such evidence is extremely accurate.
Consider the cold hit DNA case, which meets its burden of proof entirely
through references to probability. Suppose the government presents evi-
dence that a defendant’s DNA matches a sample from a rape kit across all
thirteen tested genetic biomarkers and that this unique combination of
markers is likely to occur only one out of 56 billion times. The chance that
somebody else in the world (let alone in the country) would share this much
of the defendant’s genetic code is negligibly low.69
Yet the cold hit DNA case differs from the blue bus hypothetical only in
degree. If the plaintiff in Smith could prove that the only blue bus, aside
from the defendant’s, drove down Main Street only once every thousand
years, her case would rely just as much on probabilities. If pure mathemati-
cal proof—divorced from the sorts of evidence that juries can see, hear, and
perceive themselves—cannot inspire a felt belief, then cold hit DNA cases
68. New Jersey’s experience curbing the influence of eyewitness testimony provides a
good example of the courts’ using both appeals and procedural rights in order to correct
errors at trial. After digesting the wide-ranging experimental and observational evidence on
the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony, the New Jersey Supreme Court introduced new limita-
tions on the admission of such testimony at trial. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
69. But not as low as one might think. For a discussion of proper pigeonholing methods,
see Philippe Golle, Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population,
Proc. Fifth Ass’n Computing Machinery Workshop on Privacy Electronic Soc’y 77
(2006), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1179615.
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would have to fail. But this outcome is intolerable as a practical matter and
perverse as a normative matter.
If DNA cases are legitimate, the blue bus hypothetical must be reconsid-
ered, too. There is no reason to allow a plaintiff to win a suit against a bus
company that runs only 49% of the city’s blue buses when she supplements
her evidence with a barely credible eyewitness while rejecting the suit of a
plaintiff who sues a bus company that runs 99% of Main Street’s blue
buses.70 Instead of fretting over the probabilistic nature of evidence, courts
should strive to make peace with the doubt that does, and should, accom-
pany all factual determinations in law. After all, the study of quantum phys-
ics is rapidly moving toward an understanding of the universe that is driven
entirely by probability theory.71 If the laws of nature are probabilistic, surely
the laws of law will have to be as well.
Courts have proven to be much less perplexed by probabilistic evidence
than the academic debate would suggest. The Arizona Supreme Court had to
decide a case with all the zany qualities of a law school hypothetical: a stu-
dent at a boarding school contracted a severe case of salmonella from one of
between 100 and 120 meals consumed on campus.72 Every meal but one was
prepared by an independent contractor, but that one meal was prepared by
the school, and none of the evidence presented could help establish or rule
out the school-made meal as the cause of the plaintiff’s illness.73 Despite the
similarities to the famous blue bus hypothetical, the Arizona Supreme Court
had no difficulty granting the school’s motion for summary judgment and
allowing the case against the contractor to proceed.74
In the context of criminal procedure, courts have already accepted inves-
tigatory tools that substitute for human judgment. Cold hit DNA matching
is one unusually accurate statistical tool, but there are other error-prone
tools that have been deemed sufficient for Fourth Amendment standards.
For example, the Supreme Court has approved the use of alerts from narcot-
ics-sniffing dogs to establish probable cause to search cars and luggage.75
Justice Souter strongly disagreed with these decisions partly on the grounds
70. This is the perspective that Schauer ascribes to statisticians in his assessment of the
gatecrashers and blue bus problems. See Schauer, supra note 15, at 88–89; see also F.E.
Guerra-Pujol, Visualizing Probabilistic Proof: The Case for Bayes, 7 Wash. U. Jurisprudence
Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271870
(pointing out that the Smith plaintiff could have testified that she had seen the defendant’s
logo on the bus but that her identification testimony might well have been wrong).
71. See Does Probability Come from Quantum Physics?, U.C. Davis News & Info. (Feb. 5,
2013), http://news.ucdavis.edu/search/printable_news.lasso?id=10491&table=news.
72. Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Ariz. 1990).
73. Id. at 1002–03.
74. Id. at 1009–10.
75. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983). The Supreme Court recently decided that bringing a dog up to the front door of a
home is unconstitutional, but its decision involved a different issue (whether the physical tres-
pass of the police dog was an impermissible search). Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
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that narcotics dogs make errors.76 He rightly criticized the Court’s early
opinions on the topic for either failing to address canine error or, worse yet,
implying that the dogs are infallible.77 Subsequent cases show that the Court
now acknowledges that the dogs make mistakes, but it remains willing to
permit their use anyway.78
This is sensible. Although narcotics dogs do create false alerts,79 their hit
rates far outperform those of highway patrolmen in predicting which cars
contain drugs.80 They even outperform the success rates of warrant-based
home searches—the gold standard for criminal investigation.81
For some scholars, however, the dog-sniff cases showcase everything
that is wrong with criminal procedure today.82 Most scholars object for the
reasons just discussed—that drug-detecting dogs are prone to error.83
Others object that dogs can be used in discriminatory ways, which is true
enough depending on how or, more importantly, where they are deployed.84
But this remains a concern for every type of investigation, including those
based on human observations and judgments. Moreover, the random error
of the dog nose, when it does misfire, is usually free from the prejudices that
can influence the (nonrandom) error of human police.
76. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also noted, in a
remark unrelated to the discussion here, that the presence of a police dog causes intimidation
and embarrassment, regardless of whether the dog alerts. Id. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
78. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056–58 (2013).
79. United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 954 (8th Cir. 2007) (54% hit rate); United
States v. Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007) (60% hit rate); United States
v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (92% hit rate).
80. See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 849 (Maryland’s state patrol hit rate ranged
between 32% and 34%); see also Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87
Tex. L. Rev. 913, 925 (2009) (citing, based on highway-patrol data, hit rates ranging from
35.1% to 52.5% for probable-cause car searches).
81. Jane Bambauer, Defending the Dog, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1203, 1206 (2013) (comparing
dog hit rates to home warrant hit rates). But see Minzner, supra note 80, at 923 n.38 (citing
success rates as high as 93% for warrant-based searches).
82. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the
Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735 (2007); Richard
E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 22 (2006) (discuss-
ing false-positive errors); Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of
the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 Hastings L.J. 15 (1990) (criticizing dog-sniff tracking as evidence at
trial). But see James B. Johnston, Drugs, Dogs, and the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis of Justice
Stevens’ Opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 24 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 659 (2006); Kit Kinports,
The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 64 (2013),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/7/LRColl2013n7Kinports.pdf.
83. See supra note 82.
84. See Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong, Chi. Trib., Jan. 6, 2011, at 1,
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-06/news/ct-met-canine-officers-201101
05_1_drug-sniffing-dogs-alex-rothacker-drug-dog (uncovering evidence of biased handling—
the rate for Hispanic drivers was much lower).
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Still, some may be troubled that searches based on dog alerts are not
grounded in any evidence of suspicious behavior. This objection will be
taken up next.
C. Suspicious Conduct Theories
Taslitz proposes an appealing theory that individualization requires an
assessment based on the suspect’s own conduct or behavior.85 This theory
eliminates the injustice of treating individuals differently due to attributes
that they cannot manage or alter themselves.
Racial profiling is the motivating example for Taslitz. Although crime
rates do vary by race and gender,86 the variance by race is greatly diminished
when socioeconomic conditions are controlled.87 And since law enforcement
has historically given too much weight to race and gender,88 a prophylactic
prohibition on using those factors in criminality profiles helpfully pushes
law enforcement to use other, more predictive factors to determine reasona-
ble suspicion and probable cause.
But the conduct theory of individualization falls apart outside the con-
text of racial profiling. While the conduct theory matches some of the classic
means of building suspicion—casing a store89 or looking around ner-
vously90—it cannot explain large swaths of criminal procedure.91 Police are
allowed to stop and search some people who have not exhibited any odd
behaviors. Take, for example, the unlucky lot whose cars are searched in
response to a false alert from a narcotics-sniffing dog. Unless they were car-
rying a trunkful of Snausages, these individuals’ conduct played no role in
the police’s decision to search. Similarly, individuals matching a description
from a victim or witness cannot alter their behavior to avoid suspicion. And
85. Taslitz, supra note 18, at 146 (“Roughly defined, individualized suspicion is the idea
that the state should judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions, character,
thoughts, and situation.”); id. at 160 (“Yet this judgment still retains a relatively individualized
quality because it turns on observations of this individual’s prior behavior . . . .”); see also
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 685–86 (1994); Underwood, supra note 32, at
1447. The Supreme Court has suggested that individualization depends on the suspect’s con-
duct as well. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).
86. See, e.g., Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 236018,
Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980–2008, at 14 (2011), available at http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
87. See Julie A. Phillips, White, Black, and Latino Homicide Rates: Why the Difference?, 49
Soc. Probs. 349 (2002); Robert J. Sampson et al., Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Dispari-
ties in Violence, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 224 (2005).
88. See Section II.D.4 for a discussion of racial bias in policing.
89. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
90. United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1981).
91. Colb points out that suspicion is controlled by what the government knows and that
it remains extrinsic to an individual’s conduct and culpability. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Pri-
vacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456, 1459 (1996).
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the subjects of tips form another class of searched individuals whose suspi-
cion was not necessarily based on conduct.92 Like the targets of a mistaken
dog nose, these subjects will be unable to alter their behavior to avoid the
stop.
Even if it were possible to reconfigure individualized suspicion so that it
conformed to a conduct-driven rule, it would be unwise to do so. First, the
line between conduct and attribute is difficult to manage. For example, is a
person’s location a form of conduct? If so, this detracts from the rule’s ap-
peal. Surely many people who live in or travel through “high-crime” neigh-
borhoods would avoid those areas if they could. And what about the
Harvard students living in a dormitory? Attending college is a choice. Would
the conduct rule allow the officer in the Article’s introductory hypothetical
to obtain a warrant to search all Harvard dormitories? The line between
conduct and nonconduct is inadministrable.
Moreover, even if the rule were administrable, requiring suspicion to
arise from observed conduct alone would displace some of the more reliable
gauges for suspicion (DNA matching, dogs, tips from reliable informants)
and would consequently put more pressure on some of the less reliable
profiles for crime (nervousness, flight, style of dress). This shift in focus
could exacerbate the already lopsided distribution of law-enforcement costs
on the poor.
D. Crime-Out Investigations
A final theory for individualization rejects law-enforcement investiga-
tions that go out in search of suspicious people in favor of investigations
stemming from an already committed crime. Harcourt’s book Against Pre-
diction warns against actuarial law-enforcement methods that attempt to
sort out suspicious people.93 He objects in particular to predictions of crimi-
nal personality.94 Profiles developed to identify a segment of the population
that is more likely to commit crime bear an unnerving resemblance to past
eugenics movements.95 Probabilistic inferences that stem from the scene of a
92. See, e.g., People v. Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
2012), aff’d, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); People v. Johnson, 235 Cal. Rptr.
62 (Ct. App. 1987).
93. Harcourt, supra note 5. Despite his thoroughness in every other aspect, Harcourt
spends little time defining these actuarial methods and explaining how they differ from other
methods. First, Harcourt defines by example. He differentiates actuarial profiles from the pro-
cess of identifying a suspect based on an eyewitness description. Id. at 18. Similarly, he notes
that DNA evidence used to match a suspect to a crime does not “concern itself with the
offending rates of any particular group.” Id. The examples that Harcourt later uses to distin-
guish actuarial policing (a homicide investigation and an eyewitness account) are also crime
out. Id. at 104.
94. See, e.g., id. at 174–80 (discussing Burgess and other pioneers of predictive modeling
for penal decisions).
95. Richard Hil & Barbara Hocking, Genes for Crime: Do They Fit?, in Recoding Nature
163, 164–66 (Richard Hindmarsh & Geoffrey Lawrence eds., 2004) (describing the work of
Charles Davenport, Francis Galton, and Karl Pearson in attempting to define and weed out a
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particular crime, by contrast, can avoid these uncomfortable similarities. As
long as police departments work outward from a particular crime rather
than surveying the public and looking for suspicious types, we can be confi-
dent that suspicion is growing from the facts of a particular, individual case.
In other words, we might distinguish “crime-out” investigations from
“suspect-in” investigations. But while this distinction is useful,96 it cannot do
all the constitutional work here. The scope of suspect-in investigations in-
cludes many sound and sanctioned practices. To give just one example, the
conduct that caught Officer McFadden’s eye in Terry v. Ohio led to a sus-
pect-in investigation. Terry was casing a men’s clothing store, pacing in front
of it and conferring with his conspirator. McFadden’s observations of this
behavior aroused his suspicion even though he was not following the leads
from an already committed crime.97
McFadden’s decision to stop and question Terry was sufficiently particu-
larized for the Court.98 What McFadden observed is a useful and often
deployed actuarial profile: people who pace in front of a building, paying
attention to its details, might be plotting a robbery. Of course, the profile is
not perfect—chronic pacers, window shoppers, and architectural enthusiasts
may be lumped in with the robbers. But courts have found that this type of
evidence is sufficiently individualized.
Moreover, the Terry case points to a larger problem with Harcourt’s
definition: adhering to the crime-out mode of individualization would wipe
out most of the opportunities for police to thwart attempted criminal activ-
ity.99 It is also of limited value for underreported crimes. Crime-out investi-
gations only begin once a crime has been committed and the authorities
know that it has been committed.100 The scope is much too narrow for a
constitutional limit on investigation.
genetic component of criminal behavior and tracing its relationship to the eugenics
movements).
96. Christopher Slobogin uses a similar “event-driven” versus “suspect-driven” dichot-
omy in his work. Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Sur-
veillance and the Fourth Amendment 183–86 (2007).
97. 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
99. One could imagine some plotted and premeditated crimes that could trigger investi-
gations before the crime is completed—for example, if a potential victim reports that some-
body is following him in a suspicious way.
100. Harcourt goes on to explain that actuarial methods are “criminal justice determina-
tions that do not rest simply on probabilities but on statistical correlations between group
traits and group criminal offending rates.” Harcourt, supra note 5, at 18. The scope of this
definition depends on how “group traits” are defined, however. If groups can be determined
by any shared quality, then the subjects of tips or chronic pacers (who appear to be casing)
would constitute an actuarial profile. Even the subset of people who happen to match eyewit-
ness descriptions of perpetrators shares a trait that could be used to define a group, although
members of that subset look very little like each other. It’s true that these are not demographic
or immutable characteristics that rankle scholars the most, but neither are the shared traits in
drug-courier profiles (such as use of air fresheners or the presence of fast-food wrappers). If
any set of generalizations is actuarial, this leaves no room for the criminal justice determina-
tions that aren’t actuarial. See supra Section I.A.
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E. Ending the Status Quo
Existing theories of individualization fail to provide a satisfying account
of its purpose. In practice, the doctrine has served only to ossify the familiar
methods and tools, thereby preserving the status quo for no principled rea-
son. Supreme Court precedents place great emphasis on the narrative of the
experienced policeman,101 and as a result the most respected sources of indi-
vidualized suspicion are the least reliable and the least fair.
An officer’s testimony about what he or she observed is prone to mis-
judgment or even outright deceit (a practice common enough to have in-
spired a cute nickname—“testilying”102). And apart from perjury, judges
expect officers to use squishy, subjective factors like furtive movements,103
suspicious bulges,104 the officer’s training and experience,105 “surveillance-
conscious behavior,” and “high-crime areas” to build up suspicion in a par-
ticularized way, despite ample evidence that these factors are poor predictors
of criminal activity.106 While such evidence seems to satisfy courts’ desire for
individualization, the evidence does not reliably increase the chance that the
target is engaged in crime.107 Thus, current attempts at individualization do
worse than nothing. They corrode the suspicion standards by allowing an
officer’s unscientific opinions to guide predictions of crime.
101. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (relying on officer testimony about
a suspect’s nervous, evasive behavior to establish reasonable suspicion); Terry, 392 U.S. at
22–23 (analyzing Officer McFadden’s observations and experience).
102. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse 233 (1994); David N. Dorfman,
Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 455, 480 (1999); Christopher
Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037 (1996).
103. People v. Woods, 475 N.E.2d 442, 442 (N.Y. 1984).
104. People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Hudson, 527 N.Y.S.2d
919, 919 (App. Div. 1988).
105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d 147, 149–50 (3d Cir. 1998);
Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 121 (Del. 2002); State v. Lafferty, 967 P.2d 363, 366 (Mont.
1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Flynn, 251 P.3d 143 (Mont. 2011).
106. “High-crime area” was used as a justification in over 55% of the stops performed in
New York between 2004 and 2009. Jeffrey Fagan compared the use of “high-crime area” as a
justification across precincts to see if that justification correlated with actual crime data. It did
not. Even in the precincts with the lowest crime rates, “high-crime area” was used as a justifi-
cation nearly 55% of the time. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, supra note 7, at 53–54; Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and
Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev.
1587, 1594, 1605–22 (2008) (“[T]here is no definitional clarity to the ‘high-crime area’ term
now regularly used by the courts post-Wardlow.”).
107. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 106, at 1605–22. Judge Kozinski on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals criticized his colleagues’ acceptance of testimony about a “high-crime
area” without any hard evidence. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Are such estimates sufficiently precise to tell us any-
thing useful about the area? I wouldn’t have thought so, although I could be persuaded other-
wise. But my colleagues don’t even pause to ask the questions. To them, it’s a high crime area,
because the officers say it’s a high crime area.”).
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It gets worse. Traditional routes to individualization distribute their in-
trusions in severely regressive ways. It’s no secret that discretion- and obser-
vation-driven policing lead to more searches of poor and minority
subjects.108 This is at least partially a result of where police spend their time.
But the accumulation of recent Fourth Amendment rules has not helped.
The upper classes can afford copious curtilage,109 usually hang out in “low-
crime areas,”110 and may wear form-fitting bulgeless clothing more often.111
Thus, poor and minority communities serve a disproportionate share of the
prison time for minor drug convictions, despite having drug-usage rates
similar to those of upper-class and white communities.112 In contrast, algo-
rithms are more likely to cast their cold accusations on everybody.
The unavoidable conclusion is that individualization, when courts have
insisted on it, has permitted a high degree of error to infect the criminal-
investigation process. Justifications for the individualization requirement
have spared the courts the embarrassment of rejecting long-trusted sources
of suspicion, but so far existing theories of individualization have offered
very little to justify its exalted place in constitutional law.113
II. Hassle
The individualization half of “individualized suspicion” is in trouble.
Scholars who defend it cannot articulate which types of criminal investiga-
tions should be considered unconstitutional despite their high likelihood of
success. And yet the concept has irrefutable magnetism.
108. See David K. Shipler, The Rights of the People: How Our Search for Safety
Invades Our Liberties 55 (2011).
109. For example, in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the Supreme Court found
that bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the door of a house constituted a search. But because the
opinion dealt with physical trespass onto the curtilage, lower courts have permitted the same
technique on the front doors of apartments. See, e.g., State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676 (N.D.
2013).
110. See Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences
for Cities, 81 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 159 (1999) (demonstrating that high-income households
leave urban centers when the risk of crime is high); see also Ferguson & Bernache, supra note
106, at 1591–93 (criticizing the term “high-crime area” for lacking objectivity and cataloguing
the literature that asserts that the factor has been used in racially and class-biased ways).
111. See, e.g., Dean A. Dabney et al., The Impact of Implicit Stereotyping on Offender Profil-
ing: Unexpected Results from an Observational Study of Shoplifting, 33 Crim. Just. & Behav.
646, 669 (2006) (raising the possibility that peoples’ perceptions about how “baggy” clothing
is, and thus how likely it might be to conceal stolen merchandise, could vary by race).
112. CDC Drug Usage Table, supra note 12. But the government may use drug-offense
pleas to bargain away the prosecution of more serious crimes. See K. Jack Riley et al., Just
Cause or Just Because?: Prosecution and Plea-Bargaining Resulting in Prison
Sentences on Low-Level Drug Charges in California and Arizona (2005).
113. I am by no means the first to push back against the status quo in favor of some more
overtly statistical decisionmaking. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Ver-
dicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods,
75 Cornell L. Rev. 247, 250 (1990); Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding when DNA
Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1130 (2010).
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This Part proposes a new understanding of the individualization re-
quirement. Courts and scholars have focused exclusively on the particulars
of the stopped or searched suspect. They ask, “Why her?” This is the wrong
question. More precisely, the suspicion layer of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion already addresses this question. Why her? Because she lives in a Harvard
dorm room, so there is a 60% chance that she has narcotics.
Instead, the individualization inquiry should ask, “Why not everybody
else?” After all, while we do not all live in Harvard dorm rooms, we do all
wind up, at some point, in circumstances in which our benign behavior may
legitimately pique law-enforcement suspicion. We stand on corners, and
look over our shoulders, and purchase Bob Marley CDs. The Fourth
Amendment must offer some assurance that most of the time, most of us
will be excluded from stops and searches even though we pass through these
temporary states of heightened suspicion.
This Part identifies the unsung virtues of individualization. If “suspi-
cion” can be summarized mathematically as a hit rate (the chance that evi-
dence will be discovered in the course of a stop or search), individualization
can be captured as a hassle rate: the chance that an innocent person will
have to undergo a stop or search.
Section II.A provides a descriptive model that captures in a nutshell how
well a given criminal-investigation program is working. Section II.B then
establishes the connection between hassle rates and individualization. The
individualization practices routinely endorsed in case law and scholarship
accomplish the goal of limiting how many other people the police can prac-
ticably search. This reduces hassle on the innocent people. Moreover, al-
though discussions of individualization have historically focused on the
searched or stopped suspect, the interest in excluding others has quietly
guided the reasoning. Some courts have explicitly considered hassle without
quite knowing how it fits into the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Fi-
nally, Section II.C concludes by showing that understanding individualiza-
tion in terms of hassle explains many other instincts that have circulated in
the individualized-suspicion case law.
By renovating individualization consciously to minimize hassle, courts
can transparently address problems that have been latent motivators in
probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion cases. At the very least, renovating
the concept of individualization gives it something useful to do while satisfy-
ing a demand for a type of justice that has not yet found a home in the
Fourth Amendment’s protection.
A. A Compact Model for Criminal Investigations
A criminal-investigation program can be summarized using four statis-
tics: the base rate, the hit rate, the miss rate, and the hassle rate.
The base rate is the rate at which crime is committed.
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Base Rate = 
where:
     = total population for the relevant jurisdiction
    = number of people within the jurisdiction committing the particular crime or crimes.
The hit rate is the proportion of searched individuals who are caught
with contraband or evidence of a crime.114
Hit Rate = 
where:
     = subset of the population searched
     = subset of the population searched and caught.
The miss rate reflects the proportion of criminals who are not caught.
Miss Rate = 
where:
     = number of people within the jurisdiction committing the particular crime or crimes
     = subset of the population searched and caught.
And finally, the hassle rate shows the proportion of the innocent popu-
lation who are searched fruitlessly.
Hassle Rate = 
where:
     = subset of the population searched
     = subset of the population searched and caught
     = total population for the relevant jurisdiction
= number of people within the jurisdiction committing the particular crime or crimes.
114. For now, to keep the discussion simple, I am ignoring the additional harm from
searching the same person more than once. A better measure of hassle would find the propor-
tion of the innocent population stopped once and then add to it a weighted proportion of the
innocent population stopped twice, another weighted proportion of the innocent population
stopped three times, and so forth. The weights should be nonlinear since studies have found
that the frustration and distrust caused by stops and searches increase exponentially by the
number of compelled stops and searches.
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Each of these figures will vary by crime, program, jurisdiction, time
frame, and population. And we will often lack the data needed to calculate
each of the statistics with precision. This is especially true for miss rates and
base rates since, by definition, criminals who are not detected by law en-
forcement cannot appear in police data. But taken together, rough estimates
of these statistics form a thumbnail sketch of the costs of criminal-investiga-
tion processes. In fact, estimates of any three will suffice since the fourth can
be derived from the others.115
An optimal criminal-investigation system will have low base rates, miss
rates, and hassle rates, and high hit rates. Ideally these rates will not vary
dramatically across race and class. But the incentives to optimize the scale
and distribution of these rates come from varying sources of law.
Base rates are not in the government’s direct control because they mea-
sure the criminal behavior of the population. We depend on political
processes to create policies that will deter the commission of future crime.
Since crime deterrence is a majoritarian interest, the incentives do not have
or need constitutional reinforcement. The Fourth Amendment is also agnos-
tic about miss rates, again leaving it to political processes to create the right
incentives for detection.116 It is worth noting, though, that disparities in miss
rates across race (and other constitutionally protected classes) could impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause if race is used to
select a population for further investigation and screening.117
Hit rates are a different matter. The Fourth Amendment keeps a watch-
ful eye on them through the suspicion standards (either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion). Because many jurisdictions have monitoring and re-
cord-keeping requirements as a result of prior consent decrees,118 there are
some fairly good data on the hit rates for a smattering of programs. In the
late 1990s, Maryland’s highway patrol successfully recovered contraband in
over half of the warrantless car searches it conducted based on probable
cause (as opposed to less fruitful searches conducted with the consent of the
drivers).119 Other jurisdictions didn’t perform quite as well but still cleared
115. The four statistics are composed of four variables: N, X, S, and C. Thus, three inde-
pendent equations allow us to solve for the fourth.
116. Police departments are zealously focused on base rates and miss rates, at least by
assumption. The Supreme Court has called detecting and preventing crime the “most basic
function of any government.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)). But see Joseph Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 552–54 (1960) (arguing that, because police decisions not to enforce
are not visible to the community, those decisions are not subject to the same political pres-
sures that would result from community and administrative review of affirmative police
conduct).
117. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug In-
terdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 737–38, 740 (2002).
118. See, e.g., Consent Decree Overview, L.A. Police Department, http://www.lapdonline
.org/search_results/content_basic_view/928 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
119. Gross & Barnes, supra note 117, at 700 tbl.14.
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the 331/3% hurdle.120 In contrast, a district court found that New York’s
stop-and-frisk program was unconstitutional partly because of its low hit
rate.121 Hit rates are useful signals for the adequacy (or not) of police meth-
ods that attempt to single out suspicious behavior. But hit rates cannot alone
capture the costs to society and the people in it.
The hassle rate is critical.122 The word “hassle” will at times understate
the intrusion and disrespect that can characterize stops and searches (partic-
ularly when the use of force is involved123), but the virtue of the term is that
“hassle” does not exaggerate the problem. Sometimes, hassle is all that it is.
A police officer may briefly detain a person to ask a few questions and, when
the misunderstanding is resolved, all parties may go on their way having
suffered only mild irritation. When a search is unusually intrusive, courts
will require additional suspicion.124 When a search is really intrusive, courts
will invalidate it on substantive due process grounds.125 But courts have not
been in the habit of paying close attention to the typical stops and searches.
These ordinary stops and searches have significant costs. When the ex-
perience of a typical member of a community involves involuntary stops or
searches, it is natural for the community to question whether the govern-
ment has overreached its authority. And when an innocent person is
stopped more than once in a short time, the effects are much more severe.
120. See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 80, at 931–33 (surveying Florida state police officers).
121. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
122. Colb, supra note 91, at 1472, 1505 (describing the Fourth Amendment as balancing
the intrusions on the innocent with the need for law enforcement).
123. See generally Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Stop and Frisk: The Human Im-
pact (2012), available at http://stopandfrisk.org/the-human-impact-report.pdf.
124. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641–42 (2009); United
States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[W]hat constitutes ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ to justify a particular search may not suffice to justify a more intrusive or demeaning
search.”); United States v. Love, 413 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Tex.) (“[T]he greater the intru-
sion, the greater must be the reason for conducting a search that results in such invasion.”),
aff’d, 538 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1976).
125. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (finding that using a stomach pump to
retrieve swallowed drugs was unconstitutional on due process grounds); cf. Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (finding that surgically extracting a bullet would violate the Fourth
Amendment even if the government had probable cause and sought a warrant in advance);
Jacob Sullum, Victim of Dog-Authorized Anal Assault Receives $1.6 Million Settlement, Reason
.com (Jan. 14, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/01/14/victim-of-dog-authorized-
anal-assault-re; Alex Greig, Boy, 16, Suffers Ruptured Testicle After Rough ‘Pat Down’ by Police
Woman and Now Faces Infertility, Daily Mail (Jan. 18, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-2541780/Boy-16-suffers-ruptured-testicle-police-pat-infertile.html. But
Rochin-style challenges to intrusive searches on the basis of substantive due process may run
into trouble in light of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), which held that the Fourth
Amendment preempts substantive due process challenges for factual circumstances that are
governed by it. See also Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account
of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1086, 1087 (1998).
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Repeated police stops are likely to whittle away a person’s sense of demo-
cratic belonging and trust. At best, the community will come to regard po-
lice presence as a mixed blessing.126 In essence, most people are willing to
endure the inconvenience of a stop or search despite their innocence, but
only if the hassle is infrequent.
B. The Importance of Hassle
Hassle is a problem of constitutional importance. If suspicion require-
ments ensure that the hit rate stays high enough, the individualization re-
quirements should ensure that the hassle rates stay low enough. This simple
insight unlocks the motivation behind the requirement of individualized
suspicion. Individualization measures the societal costs of a law-enforcement
program, and suspicion measures its justification. Both are crucial, and they
depend on one another to cabin law enforcement appropriately. This Sec-
tion explores the theoretical and practical importance of hassle to Fourth
Amendment interests.
A constitutionally sound hit rate reveals nothing about a program’s has-
sle rate until we know the base rate for the crime and the miss rate for the
program.127 An example will illustrate the point. Suppose the Boston Police
Department develops a profile to detect a particular crime, and the profile
has a 331/3% hit rate. When the profile identifies a suspect, two out of three
times it is wrong, and the search is fruitless.128 If the crime is quite rare (for
example, murder), then the hassle rate is guaranteed to be low as long as the
hit rate is respectable (as it is here). In 2011, only 403 murders occurred in
the entire city of Boston.129 Even if, by some miracle, the profile managed to
detect every murder (a miss rate of 0), the false positives would have affected
only 806 people. In a city of nearly 640,000 people,130 this works out to a
hassle rate of 0.13%: that is, a 0.13% chance that an innocent person would
be questioned or searched in connection with a murder. Put another way,
out of 100,000 innocent people, a maximum of 126 innocent individuals
126. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, supra note 123.
127. Christopher Slobogin and Craig Lerner have discussed the relationship between false
positives and crime base rates. Lerner, supra note 28, at 444–46; Christopher Slobogin, Gov-
ernment Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 325 (2008).
Slobogin is troubled when false positives outnumber hits—in other words, any time the hit
rate falls below 50%. But since probable cause does not usually require a preponderance of
evidence, a hit rate below 50% should not automatically make us wary of algorithms.
128. For an example of algorithmic detection, consider the algorithms identifying credit-
card theft and fraud. The hit rate for these sorts of algorithms was 1 hit for every 2.6 suspects
in 2003 (which amounts to 27%). Amy Belasco, Cong. Research Serv., RL31786, Total
Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Composition, and Oversight Issues
15–16 (2003).
129. Crime Rate in Boston, Massachusetts (MA), City-Data.com, http://www.city-data
.com/crime/crime-Boston-Massachusetts.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
130. Boston Population 2013, World Population Stat. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.world
populationstatistics.com/boston-population-2013/.
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would be stopped or searched. Again, this assumes that every murder is de-
tected—it represents an upper bound for hassle. I suspect most people
would be willing to take these odds of having to undergo a stop or search if
it meant that the police department were able to detect every last murderer.
By contrast, if the crime is quite common, such as theft, then even a
respectable hit rate cannot guarantee a low hassle rate unless it also happens
to have a high miss rate. In 2011, there were just under 88,000 thefts in
Boston.131 Let’s assume again that the profile has a 331/3% hit rate—one-
third of the suspects identified turn out to be thieves. If the algorithm were
deployed over the entire city and managed to detect all of the 90,000 thieves,
it would have caused an additional 180,000 false-positive stops or searches in
the process. That is a lot of hassle for a city of Boston’s size. If the algorithm
avoided searching the same innocent person more than once, the average
Bostonian would face a 28% chance of being stopped or searched in the
course of the year.132
Still, even for theft, a profile with a 331/3% hit rate could be used with-
out reaching these astronomical hassle rates. The police department could
keep the hassle rate low by using the profile sparingly—that is, by using it to
identify suspects less often. Or the profile itself may keep the hassle rate low
if it regularly fails to alert, even in the presence of thieves. But these are
dynamics that often go unnoticed by courts, which have so far focused on
ensuring only that hit rates are high enough. By considering hit rates alone,
courts risk accepting investigation methods with high hassle rates and re-
jecting methods with low ones.
The hassle is potentially much worse under the more lenient Terry stan-
dard for stops and frisks, which requires only a reasonable suspicion of
criminal conduct and officer danger rather than probable cause.133 Since
Terry stops are used to detect a wide range of offenses, some of which are
quite common (high base rates), a program that satisfies the reasonable sus-
picion standard could cause a good deal of pain and grief, as measured by
hassle.
Two snapshots of New York City demonstrate the problem. During a
two-year period from 1997 to 1998, the Street Crime Unit of the New York
Police Department (“NYPD”) stopped 45,000 people based on reasonable
suspicion.134 These stops resulted in 9,500 arrests—a hit rate of 21%.135 The
rest—the other 35,500—were false alerts. In absolute terms, this looks like a
131. Crime Rate in Boston, Massachusetts (MA), supra note 129.
132. Of course, the rate would be lower if some innocent people were searched more than
once, as would almost certainly be the case without additional intervention by the police. But
this would cause another type of hassle—multiple searches for those innocents who manage to
trigger the algorithm more than once.
133. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
134. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at 51, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html.
135. Id.
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lot of stops, but in a city of over 7 million people (at the time),136 the hassle
rate was actually quite low. Assuming that each stopped suspect was
unique,137 the average New Yorker had only a 0.5% chance of being stopped
during the two years. Of course, the chance of being stopped was not actu-
ally distributed evenly across society, so the hassle rate even in the late 1990s
may have been disproportionate for some precincts and for some groups
defined by race and gender. For now, let’s put aside these equitable distribu-
tion problems. We will return to them shortly.
Contrast the 1997–1998 hassle rates with the rates that developed in
2010–2011, at the height of NYPD’s controversial stop-and-frisk program.138
During those two years, New York police conducted nearly 1.3 million
stops.139 The city’s population had grown to nearly 8.3 million by that
time,140 so if each stopped suspect was unique (and of course the suspects
were not—some were stopped more than once), the chance that an average
New Yorker would be stopped during the two-year period was over 16%.141
The magnitude of the stop-and-frisk program, and the fact that the vast
majority of stops were fruitless intrusions on the innocent, convinced Judge
Scheindlin to find the program unconstitutional in Floyd v. City of New
York.142 The program had several Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment infir-
mities. The absence of sufficient suspicion was one of them. (Only 6% of the
stops resulted in an arrest, a rate that was too low even under the more
136. Estimated Population by Sex and Age, July 1, 1998, N.Y. State Department of
Health, http://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/vital_statistics/1998/table01.htm (last visited Aug.
27, 2014).
137. This is not very likely, but to simplify the discussion, I will assume that the costs of
stopping 35,500 unique individuals are at least as harmful (if not more so) as the costs of
exposing some of the population to more than one stop. That is, I will assume that stopping
one person twice is at least as bad as stopping two different people.
138. Between 2002 and 2011, NYPD under the leadership of Commissioner Kelly made a
concerted effort to increase the use of Terry stops in order to reduce violent crime. Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
139. See Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 10, Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).
140. Population, Land Area, and Population Density by County, New York State – 2011,
N.Y. State Department of Health, https://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/vital_statistics/2011/
table02.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
141. The Newark Police Department (“NPD”)’s stop-and-frisk practices apparently were
also quite aggressive. A recently released U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) study of NPD
analyzed 39,308 stops made over the course of just two years. Because Newark had a popula-
tion of only 277,140, a typical Newark resident had a 14% chance of being stopped during that
period. Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Newark Police
Department 5, 8 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2014/
NPD%20Findings%20Report.pdf. Unfortunately, DOJ was not as careful about reporting hit
rates as Judge Scheindlin. Thus, although the report thoroughly describes NPD’s practice of
failing to document its rationale for conducting stops, frisks, and searches, it is difficult from
the outside to be sure that NPD was as astoundingly bad at selecting individuals to stop as
NYPD had been.
142. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
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permissive Terry standard.143) But one of the most serious constitutional
flaws, and the first detail mentioned in Judge Scheindlin’s decision, was the
astronomical number of stops conducted under the program. The great
amount of hassle that the searches created was as concerning to Judge
Scheindlin as the low level of suspicion supporting them.
C. Individualization Reduces Hassle
The last Section explained why courts should monitor hassle as a Fourth
Amendment interest separate from suspicion. This Section demonstrates
that they already do. Although courts and scholars rarely make explicit refer-
ence to the concept of hassle, the practices that pass the mysterious mandate
for individualization nonetheless have the effect of reducing hassle rates.144
They do so by using natural limits on how many individuals a law-enforce-
ment agency can investigate at one time. Informant and witness information
is difficult to investigate. Suspicious bulges usually go unnoticed unless a
police officer happens to be nearby. And police dogs are not so numerous
that they can be used everywhere at once. A police unit cannot practicably
expand these old practices to investigate large swaths of the population, and
these resource limitations keep the hassle rates down. Although the connec-
tion to hassle is subconscious, it is not coincidental.
In the course of considering whether the government had sufficient sus-
picion to stop or search a suspect, courts often incorporate an analysis of
hassle. Consider the case Reid v. Georgia,145 in which the Supreme Court
decided that a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) officer could not
stop a drug-courier suspect in an airport based on the facts that the suspect
(1) arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a city known to be a source for cocaine
distribution; (2) arrived early in the morning; (3) appeared to be avoiding
the perception that he was traveling with his companion; and (4) arrived
with no luggage other than a shoulder bag.146 The Court concluded that this
combination of factors could not support reasonable suspicion because the
circumstances “describe a very large category of presumably innocent trav-
elers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to
conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a
seizure.”147
This analysis touches on both hit and hassle rates. The conclusion that
the combined factors would amount to “virtually random” selection shows
that the Court questioned whether this profile had a better-than-random hit
rate. This inquiry goes to the suspicion requirement. Reasonable minds
143. Id. at 558. Another 6% resulted in tickets or summons. Id.
144. Hassle maps fairly well onto Colb’s Innocence Model. See Colb, supra note 91, at
1476–77.
145. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
146. Reid, 448 U.S. at 439–41.
147. Id. at 441.
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could differ on whether the Court got this right—the third and fourth fac-
tors may increase a hit rate more than the Court cared to acknowledge. But
the Court was quite clearly animated by hassle as well. The justices were
concerned that the profile failed to exclude enough “presumably innocent
travelers” who could have been swept up by the profile that the DEA agent
employed.148 This concern would persist even if the profile did have a decent
enough hit rate to satisfy the suspicion requirements.
Reid is not unusual. Courts frequently blend and blur the Fourth
Amendment interests in suspicion and hassle, treating them as a single goal.
One court explained the reasonable suspicion requirement by rhetorically
asking, “[I]s it not better to frustrate the prosecution of an individual who
may be guilty so that innocent citizens need not be fearful of a police stop
and frisk under the circumstances here?”149 And the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals at one point had worked its way precisely to the notion of hassle
rates. Describing what is required for using drug-courier profiles, the court
said that “[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a sub-
stantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable
suspicion will be satisfied.”150 The Fourth Circuit did not recognize the radi-
cal nature of its approach. It was breaking the tradition of focusing on the
defendant’s facts and instead looking at an investigation’s effects on every-
body else.151
Jurists and scholars have not needed to disaggregate the suspicion and
hassle issues because, until recently, most programs with decent hit rates
were labor intensive and therefore had low hassle rates. But as policing tools
become more sophisticated, enabling law enforcement to use computing
power to sift through large amounts of digital information, these concepts
will begin to diverge.
The separate and independent importance of hassle rates is on spectacu-
lar display in the context of the NSA’s surveillance programs. In the wake of
the Edward Snowden leaks, the White House unsealed a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court opinion from a 2011 case decided by Judge Bates.152 This
opinion is the first decision known to have invalidated aspects of the
148. Id.
149. United States v. Carter, No. Crim.A.99-50, 1999 WL 1007044, at *8 (D. Del. Oct. 22,
1999).
150. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (2004).
151. Even Tribe and Taslitz hint at hassle rates while articulating their own suspect-cen-
tered theories for individualization. See Taslitz, supra note 18, at 176 (“[T]he citizen still re-
tains significant control over the size of the risk that his liberties will be infringed by the police.
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion thus help to protect citizen autonomy.” (emphasis
added)); Tribe, supra note 5, at 1385 (asking that a system of justice take into account how
many innocent men are likely to be erroneously convicted, which is a version of the hassle rate,
albeit in absolute terms).
152. In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
Procedures, at 78 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2011), available at http://goodtimesweb
.org/covert-operations/2013/odni-fisc-memo-oct-3-2011.pdf (declassified in 2013).
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PRISM/Upstream program on constitutional as well as statutory grounds.
The reasons were compatible with hassle.
Judge Bates wrote the opinion in response to new information about the
scale of the NSA’s Upstream program, under which the federal government
directly collects information on Internet transactions (as opposed to ob-
taining transaction information indirectly from third parties, as the govern-
ment does under the PRISM program).153 The NSA was required under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) to use responsible
means to “target” its information gathering at foreign communications and
to minimize the collection or retention of any purely domestic communica-
tions unintentionally obtained in the process.154
When the FISA court learned that the NSA was not able to eliminate the
chance of collecting purely domestic communications, the court undertook
its own study of a random sample of collected conversations in order to
assess independently the NSA’s filtering error. The court discovered that the
filter’s error rate was very low—only 0.197% of the collected communica-
tions were purely domestic. But because the NSA collected so many conver-
sations (nearly 12 million in a six-month period), the error was great in
absolute terms. The court inferred from its independent assessment that the
NSA collected between 48,000 and 56,000 purely domestic communications
each year.155
The government predictably argued that the FISA court should be satis-
fied with the filter’s hit rate since well over 99% of the collected communica-
tions involved a foreign party. The court responded, “That is true enough,
given the enormous volume of Internet transactions acquired by NSA
through its upstream collection . . . . But the number is small only in that
relative sense.”156 Because the government overcollected domestic communi-
cations in an absolute sense and because it failed to implement reasonable
minimization procedures, the FISA court held that the Upstream program
violated the Fourth Amendment.157
Although the national-security context removes this case from the
street-level Fourth Amendment setting, the reasoning in the case foreshad-
ows future litigation over law-enforcement technology. The mechanical na-
ture of the NSA’s filter did not put off the court. But the filter’s hit rate
proved insufficient on its own to justify the government’s action. That a
large number of individuals’ conversations were accidentally swept into the
153. Id. at 29–30.
154. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(d)(1), (e)(1) (2012); In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of
Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, at 14.
155. In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related
Procedures, at 34 n.32 (“Thus, NSA may be acquiring as many as 46,000 wholly domestic
‘about’ SCTs each year, in addition to the 2,000–10,000 MCTs referenced above.”).
156. Id. at 73.
157. Id. at 78.
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search was also an important factor. This measured the hassle of Up-
stream.158 And it was enough, despite the very high hit rate, to raise constitu-
tional concerns.
Courts have revealed a need and desire to consider hassle rates as a vari-
able distinct from hit rates (which are already promoted by the Fourth
Amendment’s suspicion requirement). Since existing determinations of indi-
vidualization correspond closely with practices that reduce the hassle rate,
all that remains is tying the strands together. Individualization attempts to
reduce hassle.
When a court considers the constitutionality of law enforcement’s indi-
vidualized suspicion, it should ensure that the government’s investigative
technique has a high enough hit rate to meet the suspicion standard and a
low enough hassle rate to meet the individualization standard. Depending
on its facts, a program would fall in one of the four quadrants in the follow-
ing table:
Table 1.



















Not enough suspicion Not enough suspicion, too much hassle
  Low Hassle Rate High Hassle Rate
  INDIVIDUALIZATION
The table can come to life with a few illustrations. NYPD’s stop-and-
frisk program was unconstitutional because it operated without sufficient
suspicion and with too much hassle. It would fall in the lower right
quadrant.
158. While the two-part inquiry on hit rates and hassle rates seems wise, the hassle rate
does not appear to raise the serious doubts that it did for the court. Fifty-six thousand conver-
sations collected from a population of 300 million Americans amounts to a hassle rate of a
0.02% chance of inadvertent collection—or 19 out of 100,000 people. This rate seems espe-
cially low in light of the Supreme Court’s one and only pronouncement on the Fourth
Amendment’s application to national-security investigations, in which the Court required
some limits on governmental investigation but permitted the limits to be less restrictive than
those applying to ordinary law enforcement. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
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An anonymous and uncorroborated tip, by contrast, would fall in the
lower left quadrant. It would not cause a lot of hassle, but it fails the suspi-
cion element since case law requires some corroboration or another objec-
tive reason to credit a tip’s accuracy.159
The upper left quadrant marks the constitutional ideal. These police
investigations operate with enough suspicion to instill trust in the program
and enough constraint to promise a low impact on the liberty of the average
person. Corroborated tips and prudent use of Terry stops belong here.
The last quadrant, the upper right, will gain importance as some polic-
ing practices become automated. Big-data analytics may be able to meet the
suspicion requirements, but if they operate on a large scale, they can quickly
increase the number of fruitless searches and seizures.160 Without con-
straints, data analytics can violate hassle thresholds even if their hit rates
satisfy the suspicion element.
For example, if a pattern-based data-mining program detects copyright
infringement with a 90% hit rate, the suspicion requirement would be satis-
fied. But its use may nevertheless fail the individualization requirement.
Copyright law is violated so frequently that the relatively rare misfire could
result in hundreds of thousands of futile investigations.161 If the analysis of
individualization tunes into hassle, courts will be well equipped to identify
constitutional problems with large-scale data-analytics programs without
gutting the innovations entirely. The implications of hassle-driven individu-
alized suspicion are explored in Part III.
Before we turn to implications, however, we will first explore how hassle
explains some otherwise inexplicable patterns in Fourth Amendment case
law. Even though courts have not referred often to hassle-style problems,
there is ample evidence that they have been striving to reduce hassle all
along. The indirect influence of hassle is considered next.
D. Other Instincts Explained
Courts sense the need to keep track of hassle, although they have not
made a direct connection between hassle and individualization. This Section
shows that linking individualization with hassle goes a long way toward ex-
plaining some otherwise curious jurisprudence. Indeed, the concept of has-
sle is legitimated by its subconscious application in the case law. First, hassle
explains why courts sometimes react unfavorably to searches based on odd,
but technically legal, behavior, while at other times they do not. Second,
hassle explains why courts prefer profiles with many factors. Third, hassle
159. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (requiring the quantity or quality of an
informant’s tip to justify reasonable suspicion and giving strong weight to information that is
independently verified by the police).
160. Ferguson, supra note 85.
161. Approximately 46% of American adults have pirated music, TV shows, or movies.
The Am. Assembly, Copyright Infringement and Enforcement in the US 2 (2011),
available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-
Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November-2011.pdf.
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offers another reason courts are unwilling to define probable cause and rea-
sonable suspicion using precise probabilities. And finally, hassle establishes a
concrete Fourth Amendment interest through which courts can demand dis-
tributional justice. Empirical analyses of racial bias in law enforcement have
already exposed the disparate rate of stops and searches across races. Hassle
gives these findings a home in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
1. Odd but Legal Behavior
In People v. Parker, a police officer suspected that a student who walked
into a public school building, looked at the metal detector, and turned
around to leave the building had a weapon.162 The Illinois Appellate Court
ruled that the officer lacked particularized suspicion because the student
“could have just turned around and gone home for any number of reasons,
being sick, forgot something, forgot his lunch, forgot his books, forgot his
homework or what have you.”163 But just as important as what the Parker
court said is what it did not say. The court did not suggest that the police
officer’s stop and search were unlikely to produce a gun. It didn’t even say
that these innocent explanations were more likely than the guilty explana-
tions to justify the student’s behaviors.164 For its part, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court used similar reasoning when it decided that a hand-to-hand
trade of money for a “small object” occurring late at night in a tough part of
North Philadelphia could not support probable cause.165
These cases seem to conflict with Supreme Court precedents like Illinois
v. Gates166 and Illinois v. Wardlow,167 both of which involved odd but legal
behavior. Gates involved odd travel behavior that corroborated an anony-
mous tip.168 And in Wardlow, a young man’s flight in reaction to the arrival
of police was enough to justify an individualized suspicion even though
some members of the Court acknowledged that there are innocent explana-
tions for flight.169
What explains courts’ willingness to accept innocent but odd behaviors
as a basis for suspicion in some cases but reject them in others? It cannot be
the mere possibility of innocent explanations. Those existed for both sets of
cases.
Hassle can explain these cases’ seemingly schizophrenic outcomes.
When police must rely on a tip or when they must be physically present to
162. 672 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
163. Parker, 672 N.E.2d at 817.
164. It is possible that the chance of an innocent explanation does outweigh the chance
that the student brought a weapon. My objection is that the court does not clarify that it
harbors such a belief.
165. Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. 2007), disapproved of on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928 (Pa. 2009).
166. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
167. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
168. Gates, 462 U.S. at 226.
169. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.
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provoke flight, the investigation methods simply cannot scale up. Physical
presence is costly, and tips are lucky. Even if a significant proportion of a
jurisdiction’s population would flee at the sight of policemen or engage in
bizarre travel behavior, in order to take advantage of the case law, the police
actually have to receive a tip or be physically present. But they cannot possi-
bly show up to every public gathering of all youths who would decide to flee,
and they will not receive tips about most of the people who engage in
strange travel behavior.170
Hassle rates may be driving these decisions where the government does
not rely on some external limiting factor like a tip or a person’s reaction to
the physical presence of police. Circling a block and emerging with a bag is
unusual behavior, to be sure. But we would not want everybody who circles a
block and emerges with a bag of souvenirs, or who turns around at a metal
detector because he forgot his homework, to become subject to a stop or
search. Without something fortuitous like a tip, there is no external con-
straint on a police department that uses new technology to increase the
number of stops or searches based on similar facts.171
2. A Preference for More Factors
When assessing an officer’s decision to stop or search somebody, courts
prefer to receive a long list of reasons justifying the decision. The more rea-
sons the agent can recount, the better.172 This preference, too, can be ex-
plained by the invisible influence of hassle.
Consider drug-courier profiles. The Supreme Court condoned a DEA
agent’s decision to stop a man named Andrew Sokolow in the Honolulu
airport as he returned from a trip to Miami.173 The agent suspected that
Sokolow was carrying drugs because he (1) paid $2,100 for airplane tickets
in cash; (2) traveled under a name that did not match the records for the
telephone number he had provided; (3) came from Miami, “a source city for
illicit drugs”; (4) stayed in Miami only forty-eight hours, even though he
170. I assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that the differences in hit rates between
the first set of cases and the second set are negligible. In fact, courts rarely look for empirical
evidence that searches tend to produce evidence of a crime.
171. This may be especially problematic if the suspect engages in the legal but suspicious
behavior as part of what Elizabeth Joh calls a “privacy protest.” These are practices of avoiding
consented police encounters, buying burner phones with cash, using Tor to browse the In-
ternet, and engaging in other activities intentionally designed to avoid police interaction. See
Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55
Ariz. L. Rev. 997 (2013).
172. The knock-and-announce case discussed earlier in the Article provides a good exam-
ple. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. Knowing that the defendant was going to
be arrested for a drug-related crime did not provide probable cause to believe that evidence
would be destroyed with advanced notice of the arrest, but adding one more factor (a recogni-
tion that the police were present) was sufficient. See also Taslitz, supra note 18, at 158 (“If
hundreds of traits were added into the mix, it would be hard to see an individual [suspect] as
just a collection of stereotypes.”).
173. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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spent over twenty hours in an airplane to get between Miami and Honolulu;
(5) appeared nervous; and (6) checked no luggage.174 The Court recognized
that each one of these observations could have an innocent explanation but
noted that, when taken together, these noncriminal acts could contribute to
a “degree of suspicion” that surpasses the reasonable suspicion standard.175
The Court’s reasoning is straightforward enough. The chance that a per-
son flying out of Miami has narcotics on him is not very high. And the
chance that a person flying with no checked luggage has narcotics on him is
also not very high. But the odds increase when the person flies out of Miami
and has no luggage. As more and more factors are added to the Venn dia-
gram, the hit rate may continue to increase, and at some point the
probability in the intersection will surpass the reasonable suspicion
threshold.
This all seems perfectly reasonable, but given the low bar for reasonable
suspicion, it is not clear that the DEA agent needed more than one or two of
the factors to meet the threshold. The fact that Sokolow flew twenty hours
and stayed in Miami for only two days may have on its own increased the
chance of his carrying drugs to a figure that clears the suspicion threshold.
And if that fact alone didn’t do it, perhaps because business travelers often
fly long distances for short stays, adding just one more fact—that he paid
for his ticket in cash—would have helped confirm that Sokolow was not a
business traveler.176 These two factors would have easily cleared the hit-rate
hurdle, leaving us to wonder what work the others are doing.177
Hassle helps explain why courts would prefer to see more factors than
are necessary in order to clear the suspicion hurdle, even if the marginal
returns on accuracy are negligible. Adding factors to the Venn diagram has
an exclusionary effect. Each factor has the potential to exclude a swath of the
population from the possibility of a search or seizure. Courts are reassured
by longer lists of justifications because these lists roughly signal that the
agent’s model cannot scale to a large number of people, many of whom may
be innocent.
At their best, long lists of factors improve hit rates and decrease hassle
rates at the same time.178 As each factor contributes to the program’s accu-
racy, it also constrains the program’s scope. But some of the most frequently
used suspicion factors appear to increase accuracy and constrain scope with-
out actually doing so.179
174. Id. at 3–4. The suspect also wore flashy clothing (a jumpsuit and gold jewelry). Id. at
4.
175. Id. at 9–10.
176. Even at the time, business travelers paid their airfare by check or credit card. Id. at 8.
177. Indeed, one of the factors (traveling with no luggage) flows from another (short
trip).
178. Sharon Davies captures this idea with the phrase “circle of suspicion.” A good profile
will narrow the circle’s scope in order to achieve a decent level of prediction. Sharon L. Davies,
Profiling Terror, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 45, 52 (2003).
179. See Lerner, supra note 28, at 434–43, for a description of commonly applied subjec-
tive factors.
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3. Undefined Suspicion Standards
Hassle can also explain why the Supreme Court has avoided giving
mathematical precision to the probable cause and reasonable suspicion stan-
dards. The Court has declared that “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapa-
ble of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”180 This
particular explanation is immensely unsatisfying. The Court has attracted a
lot of criticism for refusing to give a probability threshold for the probable
cause and reasonable suspicion standards.181
But some scholars have come to the Supreme Court’s defense. Lerner
argues that the standards do and should have differing tolerances based on
the heinousness of the investigated crime.182 And Kerr argues that the proba-
ble cause standard must have some flexibility to accommodate factors relat-
ing to an investigation—factors that fall outside the four corners of a
warrant application but that the judge is likely to know and use.183
Hassle offers another reason to avoid fixing the probability thresholds
for probable cause and reasonable suspicion. When the police investigate a
crime with a low base rate, the suspicion rate can be lower than usual with-
out significantly changing the hassle rates. For example, if police are investi-
gating bribery, the crime is so infrequently committed that a few additional
searches per bribe spread over an entire city’s population will not signifi-
cantly affect the odds that a person will be searched.184
Hassle may also explain why courts might prove more lenient with sus-
picion requirements in crime-out investigations.185 When police are pursu-
ing suspects of a single crime, searching four or five suspects will not affect a
town’s hassle rate even though the hit rate may fall below the usual 331/3%
standard.186
4. The Search for Distributional Justice
Finally, hit and hassle rates are attractive to courts and civil rights law-
yers searching for a measure of law-enforcement bias. Large investigation
180. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
181. E.g., Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 850. This is also consistent with what
David Faigman calls the Court’s “nonrealist approach to the subject of constitutional applica-
tion.” Faigman, supra note 47, at 172.
182. Lerner, supra note 28, at 460; Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause,
81 Tex. L. Rev. 951 (2003).
183. Kerr, supra note 2, at 132–33.
184. Even if such additional searches did affect hassle rates, some crimes may be heinous
enough to allow for more hassle, and lower hit rates, because our preference to root out a
particular crime is so great that it changes the contours of our tolerances. Tribe maps out some
examples of hit-rate and hassle-rate indifference curves in the context of criminal convictions.
See Tribe, supra note 5, at 1387–88.
185. For a definition of crime-out investigations, see supra Section I.D.
186. A crime-out investigation can be thought of as a very low base rate crime—a crime
that has been committed only once. Thus, this is merely a corollary of the low base rate point.
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programs cause a lot of hassle even when their hit rates are high (and espe-
cially if they aren’t). If the hassle disproportionately affects a suspect class,
this could be useful evidence of bias.
Racial disparities in hit rates can be a telltale sign of police bias: if
searches conducted on cars driven by minorities result in the recovery of
contraband less often than searches conducted on cars driven by whites, the
disparity suggests that the department might suffer from explicit or implicit
bias that leads officers to believe that minorities are more likely to be en-
gaged in criminal conduct than they actually are.187 But the comprehensive
record of stops can also reveal disparate hassle rates, even if hit rates are the
same across all races. Sure enough, hassle rates (stops or searches per one
hundred thousand or sometimes per ten thousand inhabitants) are routinely
used in disparate impact studies of police programs.188
For the last ten years, New York City’s police department has operated
under record-keeping obligations,189 and the resulting data were critical to
the constitutional challenge to NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices.190 Judge
Scheindlin was disturbed by the disparity between the rates at which black
and Hispanic New Yorkers were stopped by NYPD and the rates at which
whites were stopped.191
The government’s expert suggested that the demographics of New York
City’s criminals would be unlikely to mirror the demographics of the city’s
entire population.192 If NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program operated on a
smaller scale—or operated for the purpose of rooting out a narrowly de-
fined criminal act—the government’s objections to Judge Scheindlin’s rea-
soning would have some weight. The demographics of suspects selected
from nuanced profiles with a good hit rate are often likely to diverge from
the general demographics. For example, algorithms designed to detect
white-collar crime are more likely to direct investigations disproportionately
187. Judge Scheindlin noted the disparity in hit rates in her Floyd opinion. Contraband
and weapons were recovered from white suspects more often than they were from black sus-
pects. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
188. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Out-
comes in the Los Angeles Police Department (2008), available at http://islandia.law.yale
.edu/ayres/Ayres%20LAPD%20Report.pdf (finding that, out of 10,000 white residents, the Los
Angeles Police Department stopped only 1,750, whereas it stopped 4,500 out of 10,000 black
residents; that minorities were also more likely to be searched than whites; and that the
searches of minorities yielded lower hit rates for contraband); Stephen M. Haas et al., West
Virginia Traffic Stop Study: Final Report (2009), available at http://www.djcs.wv.gov/
SAC/Documents/WVSAC_Traffic_NEWOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf (using search
rates and hit rates to assess racial disparities); Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial Dispari-
ties in the New York Police Department’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices (2007),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR
534.pdf.
189. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(AT), 2014 WL 3765729, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 30, 2014).
190. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 579, 588.
191. See id. at 560.
192. See id.
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on educated white men.193 Likewise, if NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program suc-
ceeded in detecting crime, it would be appropriate for courts to permit some
divergence between the demographics of the stopped and those of the whole
population.194 Establishing an appropriate baseline would have been difficult
without good data. Judge Scheindlin was able to avoid the difficult task of
establishing such a baseline by pointing to the program’s ineffectiveness. Be-
cause the vast majority of stops (94%) did not lead to arrest, bona fide
predictors of crime could not explain the disparity in stops.195 NYPD’s stop-
and-frisk program had such a low hit rate, and was so active, that the enter-
prise consisted almost entirely of hassle. And that hassle had an outsize effect
on minority communities.196
Hassle rates are also very useful in combination with hit rates in order
to show whether a police department or prosecutor declines to enforce the
criminal laws more frequently for white criminals than for minority
criminals, even when an officer or prosecutor has been presented with iden-
tical behaviors.197 For example, Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes took
advantage of known hassle rates and base rates to determine whether Mary-
land’s highway patrol was stopping and searching speeding minority drivers
at higher rates than speeding white drivers (it was).198
Given the prominence of hit rates as a measure of discrimination, it is
surprising that the harm from hassle lacks a well-established home in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
If hassle and hit rates were recognized as the twin guiding lights for
individualized suspicion, Fourth Amendment law would develop in a much
more rational way. The next Part explores this potential.
193. See Laurie L. Ragatz et al., The Psychological Profile of White-Collar Offenders:
Demographics, Criminal Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology, 39 Crim. Just. &
Behav. 978, 979 (2012).
194. In New York, at least in the 1990s, victim surveys suggest that about half of robberies
were reportedly committed, according to their victims, by black perpetrators. And since more
than half of the victims were also black, racial bias cannot explain all of the variance between
the suspect reports and the racial composition of the city. See Goldberg, supra note 134.
195. Only 6% led to arrest. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558. But another 6% resulted in the
issuance of a summons. Id.
196. Indeed, the hit rate was lower for stops of minorities than it was for stops of whites.
And subjective factors like “furtive movements” and “bulge” were used more often for black
suspects than for white suspects. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, supra note 7, app. at tbl.D1.
197. See Harcourt, supra note 5, at 28; Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual:
The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 54 Duke L.J. 1089, 1099 (2005). Prose-
cutors might correct some of the racial disparities that come earlier in the criminal justice
process. Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et al., Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement,
55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1365, 1368–76 (2014).
198. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 117, at 665–66. Gross and Barnes had to use an
independent measure of the base rate for speeding in combination with the hassle and hit rates
in order to get at the key measure: the miss rate. The disparity in speeding enforcement was
important because enforcing the speed limits was a feeder to drug interdiction. The Supreme
Court has approved the use of stops for minor violations to further an investigation for more
serious offenses. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
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III. The Future of Suspicion
This Part considers the ramifications if hassle becomes a lodestar for
individualized suspicion. Change will be slow at first. Hassle can provide
only loose guidance for law enforcement and courts because they often lack
the information needed to calculate hassle rates precisely. (For example, how
will we know how many people actually pace in front of stores?) Just as with
suspicion, hassle will be determined by experience and common sense for
the foreseeable future. And much like for suspicion, the tolerance for hassle
may vary based on the severity of the crime and on the intensity of govern-
mental intrusion.
This Part shows that focusing individualized suspicion on hit and hassle
rates would make its application more sound and consistent, would help
eradicate some of the flawed traditional police practices, and would open up
opportunities for new methods. The first and most important consequence
would be an appetite for better information and a tolerance for accountable
experimentation.199 The second would be the development of a healthy judi-
cial skepticism of police narratives. And third, focusing on hassle would al-
low law-enforcement agencies to use randomness to constrain the scope of
their investigation programs. This Part closes with a review of some com-
mon objections to data-driven investigation methods.
A. More Open and Honest Experimentation
An explicit focus on hassle would very likely drive a judicial demand for
data. This demand represents an indirect but important consequence. A
generation ago, the Supreme Court, using a derisive tone, refused to set out
quantitative definitions of probable cause.200 In an increasingly tech-savvy
world, though, the Court’s approach is aging poorly.201 Contrary to the
Court’s predictions, police departments today are quite comfortable using
statistics to develop law-enforcement policies.202 And yet despite the growing
facility with data, probable cause determinations are not “evidence based” in
the sense that the phrase is used in every other serious discipline. Courts are
199. Fourth Amendment law may actually proscribe collecting data for these purposes,
especially in light of the concurring opinions in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (positing that there should be some limit to the
waiver of Fourth Amendment protection when data are disclosed for one reason but not
another).
200. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983).
201. Faigman criticizes the Supreme Court for its “empirical cowardice” and suggests that
constitutional law should begin to establish a “scientifically realistic jurisprudence.” Faigman,
supra note 47, at 8, 26.
202. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,
2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html; Rocco Paras-
candola, NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton Tweets About First Compstat Meeting, N.Y. Daily
News, Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-
commissioner-bill-bratton-tweets-compstat-meeting-article-1.1589955.
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permitted to define probable cause using their own untested and idiosyn-
cratic assumptions about hit rates. Police methods that are acceptable to the
judiciary are constitutional no matter how poorly they actually perform, and
methods that are deemed unacceptable are proscribed without any consider-
ation of whether they perform as poorly as the judiciary thinks they do.203
The judges sit with presumed and constitutionally insulated factual
expertise.204
Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Judge Andrew Wistrich collabo-
rated on an impressive research project in order to better understand how
state and federal judges respond to the same set of facts.205 Rachlinski and
his coauthors were interested in testing whether judges suffer from hindsight
bias—that is, whether judges are more likely to find probable cause when
they know that the search ultimately uncovered evidence of a crime than
when they reviewed the evidence prospectively. To everybody’s surprise,
they don’t. Judges seem to be remarkably skilled at putting themselves be-
hind the veil of ignorance for probable cause determinations.206
But the good news was mooted by the judges’ inconsistency with one
another. The judges’ estimates for the likelihood of uncovering evidence of a
crime, and their ultimate determinations of probable cause, were extraordi-
narily varied. The 224 judges responding to a hypothetical factual scenario
were evenly split over whether probable cause existed to justify a search.
About 56% thought it did. We might expect to see this sort of split if the
estimates of the probability for a successful search hovered around 30% or
40%. (This would suggest that the facts make for a tough case.) But that is
not what Rachlinski and his coauthors saw. Instead, the probability estimates
were all over the map. The mean probable cause estimate was about 55%,
and the standard deviation was a whopping 24 percentage points.207
With estimates this varied, it is clear that our criminal-procedure rules
leave the fate of a police investigation and a defendant to the luck of the
magistrate draw. To illustrate the arbitrary and subjective nature of the
203. In fairness to judges, the police who are making determinations on the ground may
be no better at estimating the chance of success. William Stuntz called this overwhelming
challenge “Terry’s Impossibility.” William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 St. John’s L. Rev.
1213 (1998). But see Minzner, supra note 80, at 931–33 (showing that some patrol officers are
very good at selecting vehicles for a car search).
204. Faigman suggests that something like a Daubert standard should apply to judicial
recognition of facts that determine the constitutionality of an action. Faigman, supra note 47,
at 100–01.
205. Rachlinski et al., supra note 27.
206. Id. at 73.
207. Rachlinski provided the standard deviations to me at my request. E-mail from Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Professor of Law, Cornell Law Sch., to Jane Bambauer, Assoc. Professor of Law,
Univ. of Ariz. James E. Rogers Coll. of Law (Feb. 18, 2014, 5:57 AM MST) (on file with
author). Adding to the confusion is that judges seem to have different standards for how much
probability the probable cause standard requires. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: De-
grees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1327
(1982) (finding that judges’ responses ranged from 10% to 90% when asked how much chance
of recovering evidence is required under probable cause).
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judges’ estimates of probable success, consider the estimates of ten hypothet-
ical judges randomly drawn from the distribution, any one of whom could
receive the officer’s warrant request208:
Table 2.
Hypothetical Selection of Judges’











At first, estimates of hassle will be just as unwieldy as estimates of hit
rates (like the ones we see in the Rachlinski study). But in time, if the impor-
tance of both hit and hassle rates is emphasized, courts will begin to demand
better data. They may come to expect record keeping about the reasons that
a stop or search was conducted and its ultimate outcome, information that
would give magistrate judges something to depend on, apart from their own
intuitions, in estimating the reliability of evidence and the impact of a pro-
gram on a community’s hassle rate. Law-enforcement officers could also
have an incentive to keep careful records, which would enable them to rebut
a judge’s sense that a stop or search was unjustified or likely to cause too
much hassle.
Attention to hassle may also increase tolerance for police experimenta-
tion. In time, if courts become comfortable digesting criminal-investigation
data, they will also understand that hit and hassle estimations are best deter-
mined after appropriate small-scale police-investigation experiments. Courts
may provisionally accept a theory about predictors of crime, and they could
then revisit that theory’s Fourth Amendment status after the police learn
more about the accuracy of those predictors and the effects on innocent
people targeted by the program. This provides some space for law enforce-
ment to develop new predictive profiles.209 New models might incorporate
208. I generated this data using Excel by randomly pulling numbers from a distribution
with mean 55.08019 and standard deviation 24.12281. These numbers were the mean and
standard deviation for the sample of judges prospectively estimating a hit rate for the hypo-
thetical posed by Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Judge Wistrich. E-mail from Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
supra note 207.
209. “Profiling” has become a dirty word among academics, in part because the mind
races directly to racial profiling. Even apart from noting their potential racially disparate ef-
fects, scholars have criticized profiles for becoming stale and outlasting their predictive utility.
Harcourt, supra note 5, at 109. And yet resisting crime profiling is futile as long as law
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factors that the police learned from mining their own data, or the models
could be informed at first by the low-tech common sense and on-the-
ground experiences that have informed profiles for decades, only to be veri-
fied (or abandoned) once better data are available.210
While experimentation may seem far-fetched for some crimes, there is
at least one area where both the documentation and the results lend them-
selves very well to hit and hassle analysis: DUIs.
Before the police draw blood from a suspected drunk driver, they often
must secure a warrant. The Supreme Court recently clarified that a DUI
does not create an automatic exigency excusing the police from applying for
a warrant,211 and therefore police are more motivated than ever to secure
warrants using application forms that allow officers quickly to check off the
conditions and behaviors they observe.212
These prefab forms are ideal for data analysis. Some of the observable
behaviors, like vomiting and urinating, need no validation by data analysis.
But the long list of other factors (for example, odors, stutters, sways, and
hiccups) could be correlated with blood-alcohol levels and used in a model
to predict drunkenness with increasing accuracy. The same information can
also be mined to see which types of behaviors occur on their own or in
combination with others much more often than we would expect—so often
that, if the police used these behaviors to make stops or searches, they would
run the risk of creating too much hassle. In time, the form could be modi-
fied to direct police to use only the factors or combinations of factors that
turn out to be predictive when deciding whether to apply for a warrant.
These types of experiments would go a long way toward preparing for a
future with more automated law enforcement. They would also give society
some relief from the overreliance on police narratives, a topic that we will
visit next.
B. Fewer Vague Narratives
In 1986, the DEA established Operation Pipeline, a program designed to
provide training in drug-interdiction profiling to DEA agents as well as local
enforcement is charged with the task of detecting crimes that are underreported or inchoate.
Section I.E describes the limits of crime-out investigations. All other investigations must use
profiling. As one example, detecting tax evasion will depend on profiling. Schauer, supra note
15, at 160–65 (describing the Internal Revenue Service’s use of the discriminate function to
select returns for audit). If profiling is inevitable, courts should welcome new methods to
improve stale profiles.
210. Drug-courier profiles were formed in precisely this way—based on the observations
and hypotheses of both DEA agents and airport employees. Harcourt, supra note 5, at 15.
211. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
212. See, e.g., Affidavit in Support of Telephonic Search Warrant, Montana Dep’t Transp.,
http://www.mdt.mt.gov/tsrp/docs/telephonic_search_warrant.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014)
(allowing officer to check off characteristics to indicate drunk driving).
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highway patrol.213 Operation Pipeline developed a running list of indicators
that could be used to convert a routine traffic stop into a car search based on
probable cause to believe that the driver was carrying distribution-level
amounts of drugs.214 Many of the factors listed in the training manuals are
objective. Officers were instructed to pay attention when the amount of lug-
gage was not appropriate for the trip, when fast-food wrappers were scat-
tered throughout the car, when the driver had only a single key on his key
ring (a sign of a borrowed car), and when the car had radar detectors, high
mileage relative to the vehicle’s age, deodorizers, or parts of the door strewn
about the floor or seat (a sign that contraband may be stashed inside the
door).215 All of these factors are sufficiently clear to provide the officers with
real guidance.
Other factors, though, are less objective. For example, the list of signs
that could indicate excessive nervousness included some concrete factors (if
the driver repeatedly rubs his hands together, has a bad case of goose
bumps, or vomits) and some hopelessly subjective factors (a “frowning”
driver, a “distant look,” or just “eyes: the window to the soul”).216
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Wardlow, allowing the
combination of “high-crime area” and “unprovoked flight” to justify a Terry
stop,217 the police have regularly used factors like the officer’s training and
experience,218 excessive nervousness,219 a “[s]uspicious [b]ulge,”220 and
“[f]urtive [m]ovements”221 to justify their stops and searches. Criminal-pro-
cedure scholars have interpreted these subjective factors to be the product of
a power-hungry law-enforcement agency that prefers to keep as much dis-
cretion for itself as possible,222 but the courts have been complicit and share
some of the responsibility for the frequent use of vague factors. The existing
individualization case law encourages and even commands the use of these
vague and subjective factors.
213. David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues that the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race Profiling,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/29/nyregion/
new-jersey-argues-that-the-us-wrote-the-book-on-race-profiling.html.
214. E.g., Kan. Highway Patrol, Operation Pipeline: Passenger Vehicle Drug In-
terdiction, available at http://norml.org/pdf_files/brief_bank/Operation_Pipeline_Manual
.pdf. The Operation Pipeline program is now infamous for allegedly encouraging racial profil-
ing, but the training manuals avoid referring to race and obvious proxies for race. See
Kocieniewski, supra note 213.
215. Kan. Highway Patrol, supra note 214.
216. Id.; see also Kate Shatzkin & Joe Hallinan, Highway Dragnets Seek Drug Couriers—
Police Stop Many Cars for Searches, Seattle Times, Sept. 3, 1992, at B6, available at http://
community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19920903&slug=1510873.
217. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
218. United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1987).
219. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1989).
220. Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 820.
221. Id.
222. E.g., Sandra Guerra, Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance, 82 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1109 (1992).
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Courts have rejected short, objective profiles out of a respect for case-
by-case particularization. In New York, for example, police may not stop a
person wearing a balaclava even in the summertime unless they are able to
give some other reason to round out the narrative and make the case
unique.223 As a consequence, police have little reason to cite objective facts
and improve their objective profiles. And they have a lot of incentive to rely
instead on the soft factors like “furtive movements.” Because the soft factors
incorporate the impressions of the officer and the innumerable nuances of
street observations, they are personalized enough to satisfy the courts’ de-
mand for a story. And because they are vague enough to encompass a wide
variety of real-world scenarios, they make reliable talking points.224 The
vague factors are so efficient that police can’t not use them.
Changing the individualization requirement will rectify these perverse
incentives. Courts should allow mechanically applied profiles (such as
“balaclava + summertime = reasonable suspicion”) as long as the police are
prepared to show that the hit rates are high enough and that the hassle rates
are low enough. Narratives based on vague perceptions, on the other hand,
should fare poorly under both the hit and hassle inquiries. Such perceptions
cannot instill sufficient confidence that the stop or search will have a reliable
hit rate. And after the experience with New York City’s stop-and-frisk pro-
gram, courts should think twice before assuming that vague perceptions are
sufficiently individualized to keep hassle rates low.
C. More Randomness
Back to the Harvard dorm rooms. Suppose the police officer applies for
warrants to search ten dorm rooms for illicit drugs. The officer has two
pieces of information to offer in support of the request. The first is the
methodologically sound study from the introductory hypothetical showing
that 60% of Harvard dorm rooms contain drugs. The second is an affidavit
and program log showing that the ten dorm rooms were selected using a
random number generator and that no other dorm rooms have been
searched on the basis of the study.
223. See People v. Giles, 647 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (App. Div. 1996) (“[W]earing a long winter
coat on a hot summer night . . . is no more than ‘odd’ behavior . . . .”).
224. Lerner makes a compelling argument that courts are foolish if they expect police to
refrain from acting on hunches or if they expect officers to be able to articulate the import of
their explanations. He encourages courts to respect an officer’s hunch if his interaction with
the suspect was respectful. Lerner, supra note 28, at 468–69. Minzner has a different proposal
to limit, or at least modify, the use of narratives. He recommends that courts consider a police
officer’s past track record as one of the factors contributing to probable cause. Because police
officers’ personal hit rates vary and because their hit rates are stable over time, a court should
be willing to accept a reliable officer’s hunch by permitting a relatively sparse record of evi-
dence. And conversely, courts should demand more evidence from the officers who have a
poor track record. Minzner, supra note 80, at 920–22.
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Today, a judge would not respond well to this request.225 He would be
appalled at the officer’s blatant disregard for the individualized suspicion
requirement. But if the logic of this Article is persuasive, the warrant appli-
cation should be granted. The study satisfies the suspicion standard, and the
affidavit and program log meet the individualization requirement. Because
the program will search only ten dorm rooms, the impact on hassle rates
will be very low. Whether the relevant jurisdiction is the greater Boston area,
Cambridge, or even Harvard, the four or so searches of innocent dorm
rooms will not pester the community with increased hassle rates.
This outcome is foreign to our current criminal-investigation system,
but it is a significant improvement over business as usual. Randomly distrib-
uted226 hassle is preferable to the nonrandom distribution brought about by
common police practices. Police are physically deployed in greater numbers
to neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status (and reasonably so, since
that is where they are most often needed).227 Because the traditional meth-
ods of building individualized suspicion rely on the perceptions of police
officers, those methods are bound to target the poor disproportionately. A
policeman must be physically present in order to provoke flight, observe a
suspicious bulge, or craft some other tailor-made story about the suspect.
The police cannot craft that type of story about a randomly chosen
Harvard dorm, but the random selection process achieves the ultimate goal
of governmental constraint all the same.
Moreover, randomization has the potential to increase public trust in
the fairness of criminal investigations. People are quite sensitive to their
treatment relative to the treatment of others. Slobogin asked a sample of
potential jurors in Gainesville, Florida, to score the intrusiveness of twenty-
five different criminal-investigation techniques. Roadblocks earned the low-
est average intrusiveness score, lower even than governmental access to
anonymous phone and credit-card records.228 This is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s rationale for allowing the government to set up DUI check-
points and airport security screens under the special-needs doctrine despite
a complete lack of suspicion.229 The Court identified the evenhandedness of
225. Two scholars would not be appalled. Harcourt and Meares advocate for increased use
of randomness in order to achieve the evenhanded outcomes that I describe here. Harcourt &
Meares, supra note 19, at 815. Their work was tremendously influential on my thinking about
this hypothetical. But Harcourt and Meares argue that courts have applied “individualized
suspicion” as a single determination, whereas I think it is clear that courts and scholars apply
the concepts separately and use “suspicion” exactly as Harcourt and Meares suggest. It is indi-
vidualization that gets in the way of Harcourt and Meares’s very thoughtful and appealing
proposal.
226. See generally id. at 853.
227. Stuntz, supra note 6, at 2033; William J. Stuntz, Law and Disorder: The Case for a
Police Surge, Wkly. Standard, Feb. 23, 2009, at 19.
228. Slobogin, supra note 127, at 335.
229. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Edwards, 498
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (permitting airport security screens); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
893 (9th Cir. 1973) (same).
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a checkpoint as one of its chief virtues.230 Harcourt and Meares also cham-
pion the benefits of checkpoints and random searches.231 The indignity of a
search is mitigated when we are all subjected to it and therefore cannot
ascribe shame, fault, or prejudice to the experience.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed the use of randomness
outside the special-needs doctrine. And the Court has twice rejected random
searches when they were conducted without any suspicion at all—first in the
context of random home searches to ensure compliance with fire codes232
and then in the context of a vehicle checkpoint designed for general criminal
law enforcement.233 But those cases do not foreclose the randomness pro-
posed here. The randomly selected Harvard dorm search is not suspicionless.
As long as law-enforcement officers can meet the probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion standard, they should be permitted and encouraged to
curb the impact of their searches through random selection.
D. Objections
This Article has urged a bold change in our approach to individualiza-
tion. It has encouraged the use of data and randomness. Protests are
inevitable.
Tribe is skeptical of replacing “intuitive tools” of legal reasoning with
mathematical ones because people can be so mesmerized by the precision of
quantified factors that they lose track of the soft, unquantified factors. Soft
factors can contribute to the best estimates of guilt or fault. They may not be
counted, but they count.234 For example, Tribe worries that a jury may be so
taken by expert testimony on the high likelihood that a criminal defendant’s
palm print appears on a knife used in a murder that it will forget to consider
and account for the possibility that the defendant may have been framed.235
230. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (emphasizing that police stopped vehicles
systematically and that this reduces anxiety and alarm); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52; United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (emphasizing that checkpoints involve less
discretion).
231. Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 851.
232. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (finding unconstitutional “arbitrary
invasions by government officials”).
233. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). The Court’s decision in Edmond
may be regrettable considering the benefits of random searches. See Harcourt & Meares, supra
note 19 (advocating a switch from suspicion-driven policing to random checkpoints).
234. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333–34 (recounting that the attorneys litigating the Dreyfus
affair did not understand a word of an expert witness’s mathematics-driven testimony but
were nevertheless impressed by it). In modern litigation, we have seen a different problem
emerge. Because both sides hire an expert witness, jurors are confronted with a battle of exper-
tise that they have little chance of sorting out. See, e.g., Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind
Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 177 (2010).
235. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1362–63.
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Harcourt picks up these themes in his book Against Prediction.236 He
also warns that police may become blind to context and inappropriately rely
on quantification tools that stop predicting well over time.237
These criticisms are poorly suited to police stops and searches for at
least four reasons. The first, identified by Minzner, is that the truth comes
out.238 Unlike the decision to convict, the decision to search a suspect is
immediately tested and either vindicated or repudiated by the result of the
search. By the time an officer completes his stop or search, he knows
whether he has uncovered evidence of a crime. By contrast, when a jury
convicts a defendant, its decisions will rarely be proven wrong or right (ex-
cept in the case of DNA exonerations239). The on-the-ground results of stops
and searches help counteract whatever cognitive pull the ex ante statistics
may have.240
Second, even if data-driven tools can and will be misused, they should
not be compared to perfection. The tendency for misuse and abuse surely
must be counted among a technique’s costs.241 But Tribe and Harcourt do
not compare misusing statistics to misusing the “intuitive tools” tradition-
ally used by police departments. The internal, nonspecified models that
guide human intuition about whether to stop, search, or arrest a person have
a pitiful track record. Eyewitness accounts are biased and unreliable.242 Tips
are often fruitless and vindictive.243 And the hunches of police officers vary
wildly in their success.244 The comparative misuse costs of a mechanical sys-
tem of criminal profiling and the intuitive systems used today may suggest
that we need to discard the intuitive tools, not the mechanical ones.245
Moreover, misunderstanding and misuse of statistical tools will dimin-
ish over time. As the world becomes increasingly Moneyballed,246 judges,
236. Harcourt, supra note 5.
237. Harcourt argues that relying on a profile might be counterproductive if the popula-
tion of would-be criminals learns of the profile or, in any event, discovers that their crimes are
likely to be detected. Id.
238. Minzner, supra note 80, at 958.
239. See, e.g., Nat’l Registry Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
240. Also, the concepts of “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” may be the types
of issues that are mathematical in nature and require explicit use of mathematical assump-
tions. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 1338; see also Cheng, supra note 27, at 397.
241. Tribe counts misuses of a technique among its flaws, since “the costs of abusing a
technique must be reckoned among the costs of using it at all.” Tribe, supra note 5, at 1331.
242. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 542 (2005).
243. See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 107–08 (2006).
244. Minzner, supra note 80, at 930–33.
245. Sentimental attachment to human judgment is also driving the debate on airplane
autopilot programs. See Thom Patterson, Who’s Really Flying the Plane?, CNN (Mar. 26, 2012,
8:15 AM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/24/travel/autopilot-airlines/index.html.
246. See generally Michael Lewis, Moneyball (2003) (describing Major League Baseball
teams’ use of statistics to increase team performance and productivity).
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lawyers, police, and even jurors are less likely to be entranced by experts.247
As Faigman puts it, “Science and technology today are so pervasive that the
Court cannot continue its slapdash ways.”248
Finally, and most crucially, there is no principled difference between the
quantified, “actuarial” factors that Tribe and Harcourt criticize and the
“soft” or “intuitive” factors that they champion. The intuitive factors are
equally probabilistic.249 When a juror or policeman rejects a statistical pre-
diction of guilt because of an intuition, he is not rejecting prediction at all.
He is rejecting the particular model in favor of a different one.250 His chosen
model can go awry just as easily as any mathematical model. And since such
a model operates inside the mind of the policeman or judge, it is less trans-
parent and responsive to challenge.251 Faith in intuitive policing places un-
due value on the imprecision that usually accompanies human discretion.252
Conclusion
Individualized suspicion has baffled courts and scholars for the last
thirty years.253 While everyone seems to agree about what “suspicion” re-
quires, “individualization” has perplexed the academy and muddled the case
law. Fearful of the effects of large-scale generalizations, courts and scholars
have shaped individualization to center on the suspect. They have insisted
that police tell elaborate stories about the suspect’s distinct characteristics
247. This is not to say that lawyers and others will cease making mistakes. Indeed, even
Tribe, whose article is overall quite careful, makes some obvious errors in probability theory.
See Tribe, supra note 5, at 1336, 1355 (incorrectly describing the probabilities that somebody,
or many people, will share a particular characteristic without using the pigeonholing princi-
ple). As the average American grows more comfortable with statistics, however, people will
know enough to challenge and attack an expert’s declaration. At the very least, they will not
feel intimidated.
248. David L. Faigman, Laboratory of Justice 364 (2004). He continues as follows:
The Constitution’s framers were products of the Enlightenment. They expressly sought to
bring the science of their time into the document that would govern the times to come.
Subsequent generations of lawyers and judges have failed to carry forth this mandate.
This state of affairs may change with the next generation of lawyers. It is not that lawyers
and judges will suddenly volunteer to join a new enlightenment. They will be forced to
do so.
Id.
249. See supra Section I.A (discussing the snowflake theory and its logical flaws).
250. At times, Tribe’s article acknowledges that human intuition is just a set of adjust-
ments to an a priori model. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1350. For information on the cognitive
biases and heuristics at play in human judgment, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
251. Indeed, intuition resists “articulation,” which, at least at times, is critical to Fourth
Amendment requirements of suspicion. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requir-
ing articulable suspicion for a stop).
252. Schauer offers this same critique of Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Soko-
low. Schauer, supra note 15, at 173.
253. Cf. Harcourt & Meares, supra note 19, at 843 tbls.6 & 7 (showing a graph of the
increasing usage of the term “individualized suspicion” in federal and state cases).
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and behaviors, and they have trained the police to pack their affidavits with
details that add lots of nuance but little substance.
Their mistake is in focusing on the particular suspect. That suspect is
sufficiently protected by the suspicion requirement—the requirement that
the police have reason to believe that a search has a fair probability of uncov-
ering evidence. Instead, courts and scholars should be concerned about eve-
ryone who may fit the same suspicious facts and may therefore become
subject to a search. If the profile casts too wide a net, the police are bound to
cause a lot of hassle.
The goal of individualization is to control hassle. If suspicion protects
the suspect, individualization protects everyone else. It protects the public
from sweeping investigation practices that meet the relevant suspicion stan-
dard but impose too much hassle on the innocent.
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